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ABSTRACT

Much of the available scholarship today underplays the role of Greece within the context
of the Cold War between, the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of this study, we
will place Greece as the test subject of a modern approach to war by Washington in assuming a
neo-colonial master’s role to reconstruct Europe post World War II. The following thesis will
challenge the preconceived notion that Greece and the United States entered into this diplomatic
arrangement with only the intentions of containing communism. This research will concentrate
on the role of political fear, through government legislation and political rhetoric played out in
the Cold War. Re-contextualizing the Greek crisis and the Cold War will bring awareness to the
early dawn of this ideological war, or as Howard Jones describes it, a new kind of war, and how
it was the basis for future foreign interventions by Washington.
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Dedication
I would like to dedicate this thesis to everyone who has fought and perished against the
injustice that was created from the ideological differences of the two super powers. This was a
bitter war that created schisms between brothers. This battle for justice divided many allegiances
which caused undue hardship and often death to the innocent. This war was destined to create
more than just history. It was destined to create a split between the countries of the world that is
still seen today, thus- causing new paths of tribulation and adversity that still consumes the lives
of the innocent as they seek to overthrow their oppressors.
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1
Introduction: Greece within the Context of the Cold War
This thesis will open new pathways of research and scholarship into an era of state-run
fear in the lives of citizens in post war Greece. By examining the diplomatic relationship
between Washington and Athens post-occupation, I hope to reposition the role of Greece at the
dawn of the Cold War in a much more vital role within this historical period. Much of the
available scholarship today underplays the role of Greece within the larger context of the Cold
War between the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. By doing so,
historians must make direct assertions concerning Washington’s future foreign policy within the
larger context of Cold War policies. For the purpose of this study, we will place Greece as the
test subject of a more modern approach by Washington, examining how the United States
assumed a neo-colonial master’s role in its bid to reconstruct post World War II Europe. When I
decided to undertake this research topic, I was often reminded of my childhood growing up
during the Cold War era and how the threat of the communist menace was rampant in American
political rhetoric.
After the end of the Civil War in Greece, communism was viewed as a dissident course of
thought according to the Greek government. Through their state oriented procedures and
initiatives, such as psychological warfare, political fear through suppression and terror tactics.
The Greek government sought to engage their citizens on an emotional level. Washington knew
that Greece was going to be the beginning of a long, bitter war between the political ideologies
of communist Moscow and the capitalist west. Washington knew the complex and difficult
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situation in Greece would require a different approach in methodology after the British pulled
out of Greece abruptly.
Washington’s complicit and direct “engagement in Greek domestic strife degenerated into
‘colonial control’ based on ‘neo-imperialist’ methods” after the initial decree of the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.1 Secretary of State Adlai Stevenson and then President John F.
Kennedy both “argued that Greece provided a model for American action” in future foreign
interventions.2 These two statements direct this study to assume the vital role Greece would play
in the containment of communism during the Cold War. The ruling right-wing state transformed
Greece into a police state was run by the παρακρατος (“shadow-state” or parastate) which was
influenced heavily, but clandestinely, through political rhetoric and language instituted by United
States agencies in direct contact with the ruling Greek government.3
The following thesis will challenge the preconceived notion that Athens and Washington
entered into this diplomatic arrangement with only the intentions of containing communism. The
following research will concentrate on how the role of political fear, through government
legislation and political rhetoric, played out in the larger Cold War dialogue between the anticommunist Greek government and the surviving communists in post—Civil War Greece. This
re-examination of the narrative is crucial to the argument that despite being a democratic nation,
Greece was actually teetering along the lines of a Communist state and its oppressive nature. I
am particularly interested in contextualizing the reasons behind Washington’s insistence upon

1

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23.
2
Howard Jones, “Mistaken Prelude to Vietnam: The Truman Doctrine and “A New Kind of War” in Greece,
Journal of Modern Greek Studies, (May 1992), 123.
3
Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949-74 (Copenhagen: Museum
Tusculanum Press, 2006), 44.
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the Greek cause and investigating how this diplomatic relationship affected Greek sovereignty
and the legislation used to suppress Greek communists.
1.1 The Inception of Oppression in Post-Occupation Greece
The mission by the United States to restore democracy and order in Greece, with the
containment of communism, was simply a pretense to establish a modern conflict against
Moscow. This wave of Greek legislation should be viewed as a modern approach to fear through
political rhetoric and language directed at the eradication of the communist other. In this
particular study, the other refers to Greek communists. This modern conflict of political
ideologies in Greece destroyed the political viewpoint of communism by any means necessary,
including bringing physical or psychological harm to the subjects. Through Washington’s
complicity regarding their diplomatic relations concerning the ruling Greek leadership, a form of
legitimacy gave credence to the repressive nature of political rhetoric and language directed at
the destruction of the Communist party.
The Greek legislation was seen as retribution for past aggressive acts called the Red Terror
(1946-1948), which was enacted by the Κομμουνιστικο Κομμα Ελλαδος, the Greek Communist
Party (KKE), during and after the German occupation of World War II. What followed was a
reign of repressive tactics which included loyalty oaths to the Greek government repenting past
association with the Greek communist party and possible exile to make-shift re-education camps
set up throughout the Greek islands (beginning in Makronisos and followed by Yaros). The
emotionality of this subject comes into question when addressing this complex issue of political
fear and repression. Unfortunately many Greeks, innocent and guilty, perished under this
campaign by the government against communism.
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The result from these various political mechanisms of fear and terror were directed towards
the members of the KKE and other suspected communists. Those Greeks who were suspected of
suspicious activity or disloyalty in Greece fell under this blanket of fear which lasted from
liberation (1945) to the coup d’état of the Greek Colonel’s Junta (1974). After the liberation of
Greece, communists became embattled with arduous legislation from the ruling Greek
government including the ‘emergency laws’ 512 and 516 (1948).4 These laws were enacted to
prohibit any and all subversive thought infiltrating the Greek government through the communist
party. Emergency law 516 instilled the Greek loyalty board as an “authority to decide” whether
Greek employees (“present or prospective”) were to be considered loyal enough through their
personal loyalty statements to the Greek government.5
These laws were seen as an impetus of the Greek government’s “thought-control” directives
aimed at dispelling the communist ethos from Greek society.6 A few years later, the ruling
Greek government would pass Greek Law 1612 (December 31, 1950) as a measure to
“reactivate(d) the Metaxas Espionage Law 375 (1936)” by trying under martial law those Greeks
considered to be traitors because of their connection to communism, treating them as if they were
“spies of the Soviet Union.”7 Under this revamped law against communists, the suspected
communists would be tried under crimes against both the “national security of the state and of

4

Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 13. Here Samatas gives context and compares the Greek laws of communist oppression
to the methodology used by Washington during the McCarthy era as “restated almost verbatim” in comparison.
5
Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 14-16.
6
Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 18.
7
Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 18-19.
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the Greek armed forces.”8 The fear of government control now besieged the people of Greece,
as daily activities became questionable due to the loyalty of each Greek citizen.
An enduring political vacuum ensued in Greece from liberation to the emergence of a ruling
group of Greek colonels (1967-1974) in which a recurring dominant political agenda transpired
daily. This political agenda included late night arrests of suspected communists, unlawful
interrogations of the arrested, and many forms of torture and psychological warfare including
deportations to un-inhabitable Greek islands which were transformed into make-shift work
prisons. Many Greeks felt the desire to become government informers against their fellow
neighbors to assuage the daily pressures of life in Greece. In 1962, Greece had 60,000 informers
to a population of 8.3 million which ranks Greece third in comparison to such communist
countries like East Germany (with 100,000 informers to a population of 17 million) and Romania
(with 400,000 informers to a population of 23 million).9 These statistics easily show how
misleading a democratic government in Greece existed, as the state utilized a culture of fear to
police the populace.
Greece was the only European country deemed non-communist in political ideology that
also used of a police apparatus to keep the civilian population at bay. All the while, the United
States justified their complicity in Greek affairs by granting legitimacy to their anticommunist
tactics through the principle of fear from an impending Soviet territorial expansion and the Greek

8

Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 19-20
9
According to research complied by Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West: U.S.-West German-Greek Relations
1949-1974, p. 74, Minas Samatas, Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War
Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman-McCarty Era, p. 31, and Denis Deletant, Ceausescu and the
Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989, pg. xiv.
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government’s ineffective nature in dealing with their issues.10 The majority of available
scholarship dealing with the Cold War in Greece tends to focus on diplomatic and political topics
such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.
The breadth of Cold War historiography leans towards mentioning Greece as important
during the Truman era but wanes as future administrations focused on the Middle East and other
geopolitical areas of vested interest in the region during the Cold War. Most Modern Greek
historians focus their research on the debate concerning the validity of terror and fear which
emanated from the ruling Greek government’s directives and policies from a top-down approach.
I wish to address the importance of Greece within the breadth of Cold War scholarship as the test
case showing how the United States battled the Soviets in Moscow without actually engaging in
a shifting war against the communists.
1.2 Repositioning Greece within the Historiography of the Cold War
Recent scholarship delving into the past of Greece focuses on diplomatic relations, economic
stagnation, foreign interventions by the United States or Great Britain, and political and internal
strife relating to the anticommunist movement in Greece. I employ a more personal approach
when dealing with this convoluted issue of repression and resentment within the Greek sociopolitical sphere. By concentrating on specific tactics of control, I show how the Greek
government gained diplomatic influence regarding their domestic policy via Washington’s
advisers. These actions further divided the Greek population into an us versus them situation
involving fear and oppression as the preferred mechanisms of governmental control. Many
surviving Greeks do not wish to relive this era or maintain a vow of silence in fear of reprisal, it
10

Central Intelligence Agency, Current Situation in Greece (October 1948). This document illustrates the manner in
which Washington used their position in Greece to dispel the “strengthening of the Communists”, which would lead
to a “Communist Greece”, 2.
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has been difficult to gather primary sources for this topic in post—Civil War Greece. These
reservations by surviving Greeks made my initial topic of research shift from a bottom-up
approach to the nature of fear in Greece to a focus on how this fear in Greece situates in the
larger, context of Cold War historiography. By concentrating on how anti-communist policies
were utilized as a means of oppression and control, this laid the foundation for similar policies in
Europe and the Middle East during the Cold War by the United States and their allies. A
localized Greek historiography has begun to appear by academic historians such as Riki van
Boeschoten and Anatasia Karakasidou, who have utilized a micro approach when
contextualizing many issues of identity and nationality in Greece within the wider frame of the
world. My goal is to bring together an approach focusing on the way many Greek citizens felt
emotionally during a time where loyalty and disloyalty meant one’s life politically, mentally and
physically through the context of the Cold War dialectic. Through this method of undemocratic
fear tactics, the ruling anti-communist political agenda produced a fragile, yet, resistant Greek
subject forced to make grave decisions regarding their political beliefs and the safety of their
families.
Greece’s importance within the Cold War is typically downplayed in the majority of current
available scholarship. Instead, a focus of scholarship needs to contend with the “ideological and
political origins” of the Cold War took place outside of the areas of Washington and Moscow.11
By examining the shifting ideology of Washington’s initial focus of rehabilitation onto the
ideology of the “colonial experience” neo-colonialism was achieved by political rhetoric aimed

11

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 2.
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against those who held the communist ideology steadfast.12 This advancement of the American
version of modernity went head to head against the Soviet version, translating into the death of
many different ethnicities in various centers of conflict far from the safe confines of these super
powers. Greece was the beginning of this Cold War between the Empire of Justice and the
Empire of Liberty as Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad described an “apocalyptic fear”
which both sides felt if the other side stood victorious after the Cold War.13
The German invasion of Greece (April 1941) came as no surprise to many Europeans given
the rise in popularity of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist party during the previous decade in
Germany. The Nazis started their plan of world domination in 1938 with the conquest of
Czechoslovakia. The Nazi party would became synonymous with fear and terror to all those
who were not of German-born nationality. The German invasion of Greece was brought on by
the lack of control by their Italian allies headed by the fascist leader, Benito Mussolini. Hitler
decided some “kind of intervention” in the Balkan region was needed in order to “rescue Italy…
from a humiliating defeat” at the hands of the Greeks.14 Hitler viewed Greece as a symbol of
“human culture” which would he envisioned as a “moment of triumph” for his Nazi party.15
What the Greeks would call Η Κατοχη/”The Occupation” would prove to provide the “primary
catalyst for resistance” within the Greek population.16

12

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.
13
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 395-396.
14
Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American
Rivalry, 1943-1949 (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 34.
15
Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 8.
16
Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American
Rivalry, 1943-1949 (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 46.
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By June 1941, all of Greece would be under the rule of the Axis Powers, while the Nazis
focused their efforts in controlling Athens, Salonica, Crete and a number of the Aegean islands.17
To add insult to injury, the Greeks were forced to “pay the costs of the occupation”, thus
resulting in a “devastating famine” in the winter of 1941-1942 which claimed the lives of some
100,000 Greeks.18 This inhumane treatment would ultimately destroy the Greek population if
this course of action continued by their Nazi occupiers. The people of Greece were overwhelmed with a “sense of patriotism” for their homeland; this would prove vital in support of the
armed resistance against the Axis powers.19 Resistance by the Greek population took on many
forms.
Active resistance against the Nazi gave birth to the influences of the Greek Communist party,
the Κομμουνιστικο Κομμα Ελλαδας (KKE). In September 1941, the Εθνικο Απελευθερωτικο
Μετωπο- National Liberation Front (EAM) was formed in an effort to organize the “resistance
and a free choice as to the form of government on the eventual liberation” of Greece.20 The
EAM would later form the military division of their resistance which would be known as the
Ελλινικος Λαικος Απελευθερωτικος Στρατος- Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS). Greek
historian Mark Mazower states that during the Nazi occupation many “memoirs suggest that
patriotism was perhaps the most single most important reason why individuals joined ELAS”,
thus causing a degree of concern within the recruits “when it turned out that they were to act
against an ‘internal enemy’ as well as the Germans.”21 Those who were considered to be a

17

Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121.
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 121
19
Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 285.
20
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 122-123.
21
Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 313.
18
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collaborator to the occupiers were now on the list for retribution by the communist influenced
EAM.
ELAS, he would argue, did not fight for the sake of Communism, “but for what it called a
dual war of liberation – for national liberation against an external oppressor, and for internal
social reform” within Greece.22 This is crucial to keep in mind as this retribution would breed
animosity by those targeted by the resistance movement. Although the resistance in Greece
would not be solely be recognized as a Communist movement, the formation of the nonCommunist Εθνικος Διμοκρατικος Ελληνηικος Συωδεσμος- National Democratic Greek League
(EDES) would accept the role as another agent of the Greek people’s active resistance against
the fascist Nazis. The Resistance against the Nazis would evolve into a more calculated and
developed plan of action in Greece in hopes of expelling the enemy.
The November 1942 attack on the Gorgopotamos rail bridge would also be known
throughout the free world as the “first major act” of resistance in occupied Europe against the
Nazi menace.23 These acts of active resistance would set the stage for the Greek ethos to adhere
to a sense of resistance against the act of oppression by foreign entities. After the occupation,
the resistance mind frame of the Greeks would adapt to the localized pressure and the
marginalization of the communists by the Greek government. Despite the mutual distaste for the
fascist control of Greece, the two sides did not always agree with each other over ideological
differences concerning the future of Greece. Mazower claims that although the ideal of

22

Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 315.
23
Andre Gerolymatos, Red Acropolis, Black Terror: The Greek Civil War and the Origins of Soviet-American
Rivalry, 1943-1949 (New York: Basic Books, 2004), 70-71.
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communism became “more popular” during the occupation, “it remained the allegiance of the
minority” due to the constant “political indecision” and bickering within the EAM.24
Mazower notes that from its “inception,” the Greek resistance was plagued “by a lack of
centralization and an unusual degree of local initiative” causing much dissension within the
ranks.25 From the beginning, there was “friction between” the Communists and non-communists
alike which would continue after the liberation of Greece, causing these tensions to translate into
what would be known as the Red Terror and the White Terror.26 Later in chapter two, I will
discuss further the reasoning and ramifications of these events of terror upon the Greek populace.
Tension between the Communists and non-Communists “created a climate of fear and suspicion”
between the two parties as the “euphoria of liberation began to fade” in Greece.27
While most of Western Europe “underwent constitutional revolutions” in the wake of World
War II, Greece did not follow suit as their fellow Europeans. Greek historian Nikos C. Alivizatos
argues that the “political ideas and social values of the Greek resistance” was not incorporated
into the “nation’s post-liberated institutions.”28 The ruling Greek government instead focused its
efforts on maintaining “the appearance of constitutional legality” within Greece, subsequently
creating the “conditions” which would lead to civil unrest between the Greek populace.29

24

Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), xix.
25
Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1993), 266.
26
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 127.
27
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 133.
28
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy. Nikos C.
Alivizatos (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 170.
29
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy. Nikos C.
Alivizatos (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 170.
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1.3 Constructing Post-Occupation Greece in the Cold War Context
To bring together a viable argument for this research, it is necessary to discuss the primary
and secondary sources used to formulate my argument. One major problem I face regards the
availability of primary sources: the Greek government will not release many pertinent documents
relating to this era for national security measures. I have contacted the history department,
through various e-mails, at the University of Aristotle-Thessaloniki to procure some published
loyalty statements and civic-mindedness certificates. Their response guided me to the General
State Archives located in the Macedonian region.
Previously published loyalty statements from Minas Samatas’ article “Greek McCarthyism:
A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S.
Truman-McCarthy Era” (see Figure 1.1 and 1.2), appeared in the Journal of the Hellenic
Diaspora in 1986. Professor Samatas has generously me permission to use these loyalty
statements in my thesis research. Samatas states that there is little difference in the clinical
nature of these documents, as they all follow a similar structure. Throughout this study, these
particular δηλωεις will be vital in understanding how the use of the statements cultivated the
emotion of fear in the Greek populace. These forced confessions against the will of the Greek
people lasted till the end of the Colonel’s Junta (1974) which caused a major strain upon the
populace into a state of constant fear from their own government. The δηλωεις became one of
the main functions of παρακρατος as an apparatus of their intention to oppress dissension. These
δηλωεις will be discussed further in chapter three as the study will examine the similarities in
how the statements were customarily prepared in order to assert the accused communist’s
national pride in Greece.

13

Figure 1.1-. ΥΠΕΥΘΝΟΣ ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ #1 . Publishedoriginallyin Mesogeois,July-Sept.1967 andreproduced withpermissionbyMinasSamatas
fromhisjournalarticle, GreekMcCarthyism:A ComparativeAssessmentofGreekPost-WarRepressiveAnticommunismand the United StatesTruman-McCarthyEra.
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Figure1.2- ΥΠΕΥΘΝΟΣ ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ #2. PublishedoriginallyinMesogeois, July-Sept.1967andreproducedwithpermissionbyMinasSamatas
fromhisjournalarticle, GreekMcCarthyism:A ComparativeAssessmentofGreekPost-WarRepressiveAnticommunismand the United StatesTruman-McCarthyEra.
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Minas Samatas uses his article to compare and contrast the Truman-McCarthy era (19471955) through various internal legislative means and directives in the United States and Greece.
I plan to use his research to illustrate the legitimacy given through Washington’s political
language to the policy-makers of Greece and their domestic policies. This has opened up an area
which will give credence to my argument that a culture of fear emanated from the Greek
government headed in Athens. Within this culture of fear, many Greeks succumbed to the
pressures of these oppressive techniques by stating their loyalty to Greece due to suspicious and
questionable socio-political activities. These examples will bring together the language used to
give legitimacy to Athens via the action of loyalty to Greece versus subversive, communist
ideology.
Collected interviews with Spyros Markenzinis (a right-wing Greek politician from 19361973) and Anthony Bernaris (a right-wing Secretary-General of the Ministry of National
Economy, Greece) will help place in context the actual relationship and diplomatic emotional
plea towards Washington’s policy makers in the beginning of the anti-communist era of aid to
post-occupied Greece. Both interviews will help explain the path to legitimacy given to
Washington by these Athens policy-makers due to the status of Greece’s economy and state of
their military by commending Washington’s effort to prolong the democratic government in
Greece against a communist appropriation.
Markezinis states that it is “a mistake” to assume that Washington’s “primary purpose” was
simply to aid Greece in an effort to curb the communist ideological warfare which was being
waged in Greece.30 He simply states that the threat of “Soviet imperialism” was covered under
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the Truman doctrine regardless of ideological differences in the language directed by Truman
concerning the survival of the free world versus communism.31 Bernaris’ interview will help
place in context the fate of European economic recovery and how Greece’s future was germane
to the success of Washington’s aid to the region.
The abundance of on-line documents and information from the United States government
concerning their role in post-liberation Greece, allows us to see how and why these acts were
allowed to continue in Greece. This study will use many historical documents from on-line
archives of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) and Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.). These documents lend credence in relating the implementation of psychological
warfare, the initial use of covert action in foreign countries during non-war events, the
establishment of the intelligence community during the period of the Greek crisis and the
reasoning behind Washington’s foreign aid and materiel to Greece during the onset of the Cold
War. These documents will support my argument that the Washington did see Greece as an
important geopolitical locale.
Washington would do anything necessary to keep the Greek government non-Communist by
swaying her from any and all Soviet influence or involvement during this critical time in
Europe’s post-war recovery. These sources will piece together the path which would lead anticommunist officials to initiate this culture of fear within Greek socio-political by way of the
influential American officials dictating the state’s methodology of oppression concerning
communists. These documents are readily available online at the Truman Library online website
at http:///www.trumanlibrary.org and through the C.I.A.’s website for Cold War documents at
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http://www.foia.cia.gov/soviet_intelligence.asp. Many national Greek historians (such as the

aforementioned Minas Samatas and John O. Iatrides) and modern European historians (such as
Howard Jones and Mark Mazower) have produced valuable histories of the Cold War and
Greece.
Greek sources also shed light on the larger issues at hand. The biography of Ares
Velouchiotis (Athansios/Thanasis Klaras –Θανασης Κλαρας) entitled Αρες, Ο Αρχηγος των
Ατακτων: Ιστορικη Βιογραφια by Dionyses Charitopoulos will be used as a vital piece in
constructing the complex psyche of the early Greek communist resistance during the occupation.
Ares was an infamous leader of the communist influenced military wing ELAS during the
occupations and the Civil War era in Greece. This will help formulate the mental effects of this
“new kind of war” upon the Greek subject explored by the American and Greek officials in
reaction to the communist takeover. Using Ares’ personal story of devotion and submission will
demonstrate the difficulties attributed after signing a loyalty statement as Klaras did in a prison
in Corfu (1939). This stigma stayed intact despite all his personal sacrifices and bloodshed for
the sake of Greece’s freedom during the occupation. This particular treatment of Ares can be
attributed to his role in the Red Terror by the rush of anti-communist fervor which swept over
post-occupied Greece. The auto-biography of Vassos Georghiou, entitled The Unrepentant, will
be a valuable asset in describing the culture of fear surrounding these re-education camps located
on various desolate Greek islands. His personal insights into the daily lives of each of his
acquaintances, whether friend or captor, helps contextualize the role of psychological fear
instilled into the inhabitants of these re-education camps by their fellow Greek captors. In
addition, this narrative will help illuminate the role of these camps to the victim as they were
signaled out as leftists, even though most of these suspected communists were well on past their
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youth. Despite this account taking place during the Colonel’s coup (1967-1974), Georghiou’s
accounts of these camps are interchangeable regardless of the era that this auto biography was
written. His incarceration in a camp during the anti-communist era after the Truman Doctrine
provides insights as to how similar these times were despite being some odd twenty years apart
from each other.
The camps were set up using the same method during the post-occupation of Greece as they
were during the Colonel’s coup. The main purpose of these camps was for the re-education of
any Greek even suspected of being associated with communism. Many articles relating to the
point of view from the Western press will be used to document the awareness of the existence of
these re-education camps in the vast, Greek islands. Mainly from the New York Times, these
articles will help contextualize the role that Greece’s freedom played in the American media in
relation to the numerous cases of documented human rights abuses in Greece during this era.
Through awareness of these camps, the stigma of communism was utilized to desensitize the
issue of human rights when reporting such atrocities in Greece. Despite the fact that many were
simply accused of being communist or a sympathizer, these abuses contributed to the culture of
fear which filled Greek society.
Chapter one will focus on the emergence of the state-run culture of fear which came through
the government initiatives. By examining the minds of many political philosophers (from the
Enlightenment to modern-day political scientists), this research will illustrate how the use of fear
permeated in the daily lives of many Greek communists and non-communists alike. By closing
out on Stathis Kalyvas’ chapter in Mazower’s After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the
Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960, I hope to address how this culture of fear was
established through the terror campaign initiated by those Greeks considered to be leftists against
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the Nazi collaborators (and those considered to be as well). This terror campaign carried over
after the occupation into what is called the White Terror in response to the Red Terror campaign
of the Nazi occupation. This issue of retribution against those leftist Greeks who terrorized
(suspected and actual) collaborators became the cornerstone of Washington and Athens sociopolitical foreign and domestic policy during the initial stages of the Cold War. This was the
backbone to legitimize the witch hunt in Greece of all communists and sympathizers.
Chapter two will focus on the secondary sources explaining how this anti-communist
movement in Washington was translated through government rhetoric and legislation to combat
the fear of this adverse ideology. With a careful survey of the literature of Minas Samatas,
Mogens Pelt, and Howard Jones, this chapter will give an overview of the direction given by the
Greek government, with monetary and materiel aid given by Washington, in its battle to keep
Greece democratic despite the negation of many human rights and liberties. Through
government legislation, this chapter will focus on who would be singled out by anti-communists
legislation in a time of fear and retribution in Greece.
Chapter three will concentrate on the available primary sources from the United States and
Greece alike, focusing on how the initiative to save Greece from the communist takeover was
viewed as a necessary decision in which the ends justified the means. By reexamining this Cold
War narrative into the focus of not what Greece meant to Washington as a geopolitical locale,
but as the blueprint in combating the communist ideology in a battle between these Super
Powers. By focusing on this path to keep Greece a democracy, despite the numerous measures
under taken which caused the culture of fear to appear, the fight for Greece was viewed by
Washington as just and by Athens as a means to right the wrongs of the Left during the Greek
Civil War. By recontextualizing this argument from containment of communist ideology and
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principles to a look at the means of state control and oppression of the others (i.e. communists)
during the Cold War takes a major step with the oppressive government legislation and
initiatives aimed at the communists. By addressing the reasoning behind future state fear tactics
and government legislation against this adverse ideology, the Greek government declared this
“new kind of war” against all Greek communists and those suspected of this activity. This
dialectic between the two Super Powers has been told in many different ways, but what is
imperative to understand is the methodology used by the state to oppress and control those
considered the enemy of Greece.
This introduction sets the stage for an analysis of the impending culture of fear policy in
Greece and the neo-colonial direction of Washington in an effort to halt the communists within
the region. The importance of this era far exceeds what most scholarship allows presently, and I
only hope to encourage more historians to explore this era in Greece and relate the Cold War to
post Civil War Greece. The following chapters will set the stage for how life was affected in
Greece at the hands of the anti-communist government and why this was allowed to transpire
within the court of public opinion. Also, this research will introduce a police state which existed
in a NATO ally like the neighboring Soviet states in Europe.
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2
The Emergence of the Police State in Greek Society
After the end of World War II, the world was headed into a major transition between the
victors, the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe was in a great need for assistance to
rebuild not only its infrastructure, but its mental ability to move on past the horrors from the Nazi
occupation. Greece was no different in this aspect. Its economy was in disarray from the extent
of the Nazi occupation and the aftermath from the feud between the communists and anticommunist factions. The mental anguish endured until the Nazi occupation by the Greek
populace continued after liberation under this battle for political legitimacy by the communists
and anti-communists. This struggle for power in Greece was seen by Washington as a means to
oppress any possibility of a communist victory. What transpired in Greece would be similar to a
police state like in neighboring Soviet controlled regions. This would create the emotion of state
run fear throughout Greek society. This section will lay the basis for the path that led to a Greek
police state despite being considered a NATO ally.
After the liberation of the Greek mainland in October 1944, a political vacuum ensued,
therefore, resulting in what would be known as the Greek Civil War (ο Εμφυλιος Πολεμος).
This internal conflict lasted roughly from 1946-1949 partly in result as a response to the era
known as the White Terror (1945-1946), which was the “persecution of the left.”1 Like the Nazi
occupiers before them, “Greek authorities often carried out” mass shootings of Communists and
those suspected of being Communists “in full view of the public, to ensure the maximum
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deterrent effect” against the leftist ideology.1 In an annual report (1945) to the newly appointed
British secretary of state Ernest Bevin from British diplomat Rex Leeper, Leeper asserts that
“Greece was quickly becoming dangerously polarized” during this mass persecution of the left.2
He described the Greek right as in a “vengeful mood” and were more than “willing” to arrest
left-wing supporters regardless of their political values.3 These reports echoed the future of anticommunist oppression in Greece during the beginning of this era.
These mass arrests caused an increase in the number of Greeks thrown into the
“overcrowded gaols awaiting trial” causing much distress and mental breakdowns for the
imprisoned Greeks.4 The number of arrested Greeks (1945) totaled 17,984; 2,388 were “serving
legally imposed sentences” while 15,596 were incarcerated for “preventive detention” according
to a memorandum produced by the Minister of Justice Constantine Rendis.5 Greek historian
John O. Iatrides described this era as a time when “clandestine right-wing gangs and paramilitary
organizations” initiated this campaign of terror “indiscriminately against the Left” through
“mutual suspicion, lawlessness, and intimidation (of) the Communists.”6 Rendis would go
further as to place the total number of Greeks being prosecuted as exceeding 80,000 individuals,
which would cause a severe back log of court cases due to the immense proportion of cases
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waiting to be heard.7 The increasing number of arrests in Greece shows how the judicial system
began to follow suit with the White Terror campaign that aimed at the imprisonment of those
considered to be Greek communists in retribution against the Red Terror campaign. The
function of the δηλωεις played out an important role in the imprisonment and rehabilitation of
the communist Greek population.
In an effort to ease the stress placed upon the judicial system, the Greek government
made the following decrees against all criminal offences committed between April 27, 1941 and
February 12, 1945:
1) there will be no further judicial prosecutions except for cases of murder;
2) prosecution will no longer apply to cases of incitement to murder;
3) for the time being, no new complaints will be considered.8
These laws was initiated in order to give those considered as collaborators during the occupation
a chance at retribution to the communists who targeted them in the Red Terror campaign. This
was just the start of governmental initiatives aimed at allowing those considered to collaborators
or anti-communists the ability to direct their focus towards ridding Greece of the communist
threat. The results of the March 1946 elections in Greece favored the “extreme right” which had
been “accelerated by the inclusion” of sympathizers of the “puppet occupation governments” of
World War II.9 Historian Richard Clogg attributes this victory of the Greek right to the
“abstention of the left, the disarray of the centre and the continuing disorder… in the rural areas”
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consequently giving the Greek right-wing coalition an “overwhelming victory (55 percent of the
popular vote).”10
Right-wing activists “pushed” the police and the army to propose “drastic measures” with
the appropriation of “wider powers” to oppress the Greek left.11 The elections of 1946 were a
decisive moment as they “represented the last chance” for a peaceful resolution from the
impending “civil strife” engulfing the Greek population.12 Greek historian David H. Close
discusses the role that the modified structure of the Greek right portrayed within society during
1945-1950 by depending “heavily on violence” and “repressive forces” to maintain control over
its populace.13 Close argues that the ruling Greek government tilted towards an authoritarian
rule and its “primary desire” was a restoration of the “oligarchical political system” something
the Greek left vehemently opposed.14 This course of action by the Greek government was only
the beginning of what would be known as the White Terror.
John Iatrides describes the Greek Civil War as a symbolizing of both a “rejection” of past
“economic realities and an attempt to seize the state in order to restructure” Greece’s economy
by redistributing the wealth “in accordance with revolutionary dogma.”15 He goes further to
discuss how after 1950, Greek “domestic and foreign policy developments” produced significant
transformations in the way Greek “politics and society” handled those considered to be enemies

10

Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), 135.
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, David H. Close
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 139.
12
Richard Clogg, A Concise History of Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 137.
13
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, David H. Close
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 123.
14
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, David H. Close
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 125.
15
John O. Iatrides and Linda Wrigley eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy, David H. Close
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 25.
11

25
of the state.16 The following chapters will focus on the various governmental decrees and
initiatives aimed at the marginalization of the left and its sympathizers. Between the years 19441945, Greece became a hotbed for hostility between the right and the left socially and politically.
In December 1944, a fire fight between the EAM/ELAS troops and British troops
transpired in Athens which would later be known as Τα Δεκεμβριανα/The December Events.
This was the first instance of fighting between the British troops and the Greek resistance which
would become one of the “key events” in the early onset of the Cold War, resulting in a
“decisive moment in the suppression of wartime radicalism.”17 Subsequently, one of the most
important decisions made against the left was the Varkiza Agreement outside Athens during midFebruary (1945), which was arranged by the British authorities and Archbishop Damaskinos
Papandreou in an effort to quell the influence of the EAM/ELAS. This agreement “provided for
the disarming and disbanding of ELAS, the restoration of the civil authority, a plebiscite on the
issue of the king’s return, and national elections for a constituent parliament.”18 One of the
major repercussions from the Varkiza Agreement was the launching of a “wave of white terror”
directed indiscriminately against the left which under resulted in the massive “boycotting” of the
upcoming “parliamentary elections of March 1946.”19
Between the disbanding of the ELAS/EAM as a political force, the banning of the KKE
as a viable political party, and the hostile actions between Greeks and British troops in Athens;
nothing prepared the Greek left for what was coming through the use of governmental legislation
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and directives. The concessions from the Varkiza Agreement declared that all guerillas should
surrender their arms and submit to the present Greek government, many guerillas refused to do
so. Instead the guerillas retreated into the mountainous terrain of Greece to regroup and focus on
reclaiming Greece in the name of the people. Mazower describes the reasoning of the this action
of rebellion by the guerillas as not solely for a communist government, but instead as a desire to
fight the oppressive act outlined by the Varkiza Agreement.
Their decision to take up arms was an assertion of everything that was most admirable in
the Greek spirit – a fierce patriotism, a refusal to calculate where matters of honour (sic)
were concerned, a stoic acceptance against overwhelming odds. It was not motivated by
the desire to install a one-party state after the war.20

One of the most prominent figures in the struggle for freedom from the German
occupation was Athanasios (Thanasis) Klaras (August 27, 1905- June 16, 1945), who later took
the name of Ares Velouchiotis (Αρης Βελουχιωτης) during the German occupation as a nom de
guerre. The combination of the first name Ares, the Greek god of war, and Velouchi, a Greek
mountain located in the northern area of Greece was used as an attempt to show his allegiance
and loyalty during a crucial and chaotic time in Greece. Klaras was arrested for his leftist
ideology during the Ioannis Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1941) and was forced to sign a δηλωεις
repenting his leftist beliefs while in a Corfu prison. Despite this attempt at social degradation,
Klaras was begrudgingly welcomed back into the KKE because of the great need for strong,
military leaders during this tumultuous era in Greek history. Klaras was appointed to head one
of the military wings of the EAM under the name ELAS.
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It was during the Red Terror era when Klaras became synonymous with the resistance
and retaliation against collaborators and those suspected of such crimes. It was during Klaras’
last speech (October 29th, 1945) to an enormous crowd gathered outside his hotel balcony in his
hometown of Lamia that he first insinuated that despite the “silence” given to the guerilla
movement by the “reactionaries” the movement lives on through the people.21 Klaras refers to
the people in the line, “the countryside is breathing” as a means to show that as long as people
fill the land of Greece, the struggle will continue until every Greek is ensured freedom and
equality.22
Klaras mentions the price of freedom of Greece costing the “struggle and suffering” of all
has changed into an ideological battle between communists and non-communists. This mention
of the Greek Civil War emerging in Greece was not a prophecy, but an inevitable clash of
ideologies as a result of support for the non-communist faction in the Greek government by
Washington’s foreign policies and aid. Klaras urged the people to understand fully the course
outlined for the communist party in the future of Greece. Klaras stressed that they simply want
to steer the country to promote a healthier lifestyle for “our people” under the auspice that “the
people” are able to “vote without influence and for them to respect the will of the people.”23
Despite being ostracized by his party, Klaras defied the ruling Greek anti-communist
government till his death in a firefight in the mountains of Greece. Defying the decree to put
down all arms and cease any further military actions, Klaras and most of his troops retreated to
21
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the mountains to regroup where they were massacred at the hands of the Greek government
troops. Klaras was decapitated and placed in full public view in the town of Trikala. This
moment foreshadowed the impending White Terror campaign as the communists knew they were
being targeted for retribution for their past misdeeds during the Civil War.
Klaras’ resistance to authority is representative of the Greek spirit to fight through the
marginalization set forth by the anti-communists legislation. Despite being marginalized by his
own political party after signing a repentance statement, Klaras put country first when the time to
act against the Nazi occupiers. This meant Klaras would have to take direct orders from the same
leaders who had once considered him a pariah and traitor to the communist party. This section
on Klaras symbolizes that the Greek people, despite being oppressed by anti-communist
legislation, would continue the fight for freedom even in the event of their own death. The
Greek spirit aimed at fighting the impending oppressive government mechanisms would face a
new kind of enemy, one that utilized fear in the socio-political sphere as a means to control the
populace.
2.1 The Role of Fear in the Greek Socio-Political Sphere
The Greek government’s experiment in oppressive tactics geared toward the Greek left
would prove to be very volatile to both sides of the political spectrum. The ruling Greek
government would focus its policies and directives against the left in hopes of destroying any
and all influence within the Greek political spectrum. The focus of anti-communist legislation
would lead to Greece developing a culture of fear against those considered enemies of the state
through their ideological differences. Cold War historian Mogens Pelt argues that these “battles
over the institution” of political dominance helped to influence future American foreign policy
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which forms the “liberty that mirrors the initiatives warranted for further foreign
experimentations; such as the Philippines, Cuba, Greece, and Vietnam” to name a few.24
Before addressing the state mechanisms of fear used by the Greek government during the
right wing control of Greece, a clear back ground into the proper usage of the term fear must be
defined. The word fear comes from the Greek word φοβος (phobos). It is a commonly defined
emotion serving as a fundamental survival instrument appearing in response to a specific
stimulus, such as the imminent threat of danger or agony. The following section will discuss
how this culture of fear established control over a supposed democratic, post-occupational
Greece. In addition, this portion of the thesis will outline the pre-conditions to this culture of
fear in relation to the socio-political framework of the emotional being of the word fear when
dealing with the complexity of this Greek crisis.
Modern political scientist Corey Robin describes a culture of fear associated with the
emergence of political fear as “a people’s felt apprehension of some harm to their collective
well-being… or the intimidation wielded over men and women by governments or groups.”25
John Locke described the emotion of fear as “an uneasiness of the mind” which is associated as a
“spur to human industry” in relation to the uneasiness translated from actions of the oppressor
against the subjects.26 Other early-modern intellectuals help to create this awareness of the
emotion of fear within the public sphere forming the emergence of the modern state and various
facets relating to this new formation of government. Thomas Hobbes, who is considered the
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father of the modern state, claimed that the initial acknowledgement of the subject to the emotion
of fear is solely through the state’s main responsibility to inform the public.27
Hobbes believed the most successful route for a modern state to flourish is through an
absolute state. By having the power vested through a single autonomous agent and utilizing
tactics far beyond the scope of conventional warfare with absolute control the state can instill the
emotion of fear onto the awaiting populace. Hobbes alludes to an emergence of modernity
within the course of impending foreign policy and population control for future world powers
within the global, political sphere. Little did Hobbes foresee that his assertion between fear and
future foreign policy would be most accurate in comparison to the relationship between Athens
and Washington during the height of the Cold War era.
Political scientist Corey Robin describes Hobbes as the principal theorist to recognize
“political fear’s galvanizing potential” to influence the make-up of a society to “establish the
moral language and political codes of a society that had lost that language and those codes.”28
The reformation of societal norms can restructure daily lives from that of normalcy into a state of
constant fear, resulting in the emergence of a new culture dominant in fear. This new culture of
fear which is based on a more modern, conventional method will be discussed later in the next
few chapters with concerns to the παρακρατος (shadow state) which developed in postoccupational Greece. By allowing and accepting the government to oppress the communists, this
changed Greek society into a culture which allowed fear to rule their existence. Fear from the
government which could imprison or deport you at will. Fear from one’s neighbor who would
inform on you for suspicious activities which would lead to your arrest or deportation. Fear from
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being marginalized in Greek society without the everyday freedoms such as being employed or
as simple as having a driver’s license. Hobbes describes the emotion of fear as having two main
fundamentals in order to be successful in its mission to oppress certain subjects. This fear must
be created through the state to “create a sense of common purpose” for “modern elites” to exert
fear “in order to rule.”29
In addition, the implementation of fear in society has to be a product of some “danger in
the world” in order for the “illusion” of political fear to be successfully “exaggerated” and
“magnified” by the state.30 This danger is easily translated into the dangers of the communist
ideology to the free world post World War II. Hobbes is considered more of a prophesier of
modern theory during his time, as he foresaw the ability of government to further control the
population through a series of systematic, “formulated laws and specified punishments” designed
for the “proper cultivation” of fear.31 This statement by Hobbes will become clearer to the
reader after an understanding is given of what these particular governmental decrees and
initiatives meant to the freedoms of those considered leftist in post Civil War Greece.
Intellectual historian William Reddy, author of The Navigation of Feeling, argued that
emotions are a product of the “interaction with others” and their basis is contingent upon this
contact.32 Despite that Reddy described the emotionality of fear which transpired during
Revolutionary France (1789-1799) in his research. That same emotion of state run fear can
easily be identified in the case of 20th century Greece as it materialized into a similar fashion,
instilling fear into the hearts and minds of the Greek populace. The interaction of communists
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and anti-communists Greeks facilitates such a production of fear between both, causing the
dialectic within the culture of fear. Reddy writes that as historians of the past, we should adhere
to certain standards in understanding the emotional change of emotional suffering and liberties
across a temporal and spatial landscape. Reddy contends he merely wants to develop further a
“formal theory that establishes emotions as largely (but not entirely) learned” in the historical
memory of emotional freedom.33 Reddy also argues that since all people have suffered at one
point in their life, a feeling of understanding can be acknowledged by the subject with the
specific place and time.
Through the theory of constructionism, a method of constructing mental understandings
of one’s past surroundings, Reddy is able to argue that through human agency the expression of
emotion can be understood through this theory of emotions no matter what their temporal and
spatial location in historiography. He argues that emotions are regarded as “culturally
constructed” and that they tend to become clouded with other disciplines asserting “biological
and feminine” reasons for these emotional regimes.34 These emotional regimes place the value
of emotions at the utmost importance in their “domain of effort” by recognizing the “emotional
mastery” to be “difficult and changeable” and highly regarded in the societal sphere.35 The roles
of emotions (“goal-relevant activations of thought material”) in post-liberated Greece were used
as a psychological combative tool to marginalize the communists in a similar manner utilized by
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Washington’s policy makers back in the United States, this form of oppression would attack the
subject’s emotionality causing them to break down and submit to the state’s will.36
This strict regime wishes to uphold an impecunious populace which views the
government as not only the harbinger of legislative duties, but also as the natural selection to the
survival of one’s personal well-being within the borders of Greece. Reddy notes that “fighting
fire with fire” in a political situation by oppressing the populace of their personal freedoms
causes an abundance of “emotional suffering” which only “perpetuate(s)” the threat of action to
restore order by any means necessary.37 By “exploit(ing) the power of emotives to shape
emotions” through various means of psychological warfare and legislative directives, the Greek
government use of “emotional suffering becomes epidemic” in a post-liberated anticommunist
Greece.38 Through human agency, Reddy argues that through emotional suffering the subject is
able to mitigate through various means of “self-deception” to express the subjects’ cognitive
adaptability to a lack of personal freedoms within the strict regime.39 This notion of “emotional
liberty as a political ideal” holds the key to understanding the role of this ideological feeling of
an us versus them marginalization that existed within the borders of post Civil War Greece.40
Reddy’s study is critical in pointing out the need for research into the culture of fear
instituted under the post-occupational, ruling Greek government. By understanding the level of
personal freedom allowed within the police state of Greece, Reddy helps to formulate the
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“concept of emotional liberty” by giving agency to the initiatives used by the state as oppressive
techniques against communism.41 Reddy would argue that the marginalized communists
developed a sense of sentimentalism which represented their outcry for political acceptance in a
pro-Western, thoroughly conservative Greece.
One may begin to understand the emotional suffering that existed between those who felt
oppressed and those murdered by the pro-Western Greek government. This quest for a “new…
kind of emotional liberty” would prove fatal politically and in the nationalistic sense in
belonging to Greece.42 Reddy’s argument may apply to Greece in that not only did the
communists suffer emotionally and psychically at the hands of their oppressors, but also the
system “affects all those” who might be suspected of adverse pro-conservative western
thought.43
To take a more modern approach to the emotionality of fear within the political sphere,
we shall explore Hannah Arendt’s research into fascism. Political theorist Hannah Arendt’s
research into the origins of modern political fear reflects an approach to understanding the
concept of total terror unleashed upon the populace of a ruling, fascist government. This form of
“radical evil” existed in response to the annihilation of the individual’s freedom within the public
and political sphere.44 This type of fear will later be examined in chapter two in relation to the
breakdown of the emotional self through the government’s oppressive tactics, i.e., the
introduction of civic-mindedness certificates/ Πιστοπουτικα Κοινονικον Φρονιματον through

41

William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 315.
42
William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), i.
43
William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 331.
44
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1951), 306

35
state directives and the role of loyalty to Greece through δηλωεις (government issued repentance
forms against subversive thought and association).
Arendt argued that modern ideologies of political fear were successful despite having “no
appeal” to individualistic goals or “interests… or particular needs” pertaining to the individual;
therefore, the result was the stripping of the individual’s “identity permanently.”45 By
accomplishing this separation of the identity from the individual in society, the ability to instill
fear into society is successful by creating a sense of primordial fear within the subject. Arendt
argued that this primordial fear was readily present individually in society before the
implementation of total terror to the masses, by doing so; the act of total terror upon society
disconnected certain human attributes from society, such as “reason, identity, concern, and
understanding.”46 Arendt contended that after this transformation was complete, the presence of
total terror in society created an effortless path for the “behavior of its subjects” by fitting them
for the “role of executioner and the role of victim” within the socio-political sphere according to
political ideology of fear.47 This holds true in post Civil War Greece, as the White Terror raged
a war of retribution against those who persecuted the non-communists during the Red Terror era.
Arendt’s understanding of the role of political fear and its relation to the formation of
societal norms assists the comprehension into this complex issue of a culture of fear in Greece.
Arendt serves as a basis to formulating the foundation of a modern approach to state oppression
through political mechanisms of control concerning the separation of society according to an
“us” versus “them” ethos. Though her research concerns the National Socialist party in
Germany during World War II as well as the emergence of Stalinist communism, the
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anticommunist era in Greece holds a strong comparison to the oppressive mechanisms of state
control and methods used to eradicate unwanted members within the Greek population. The
ability to transform members of Greece’s society into “specimens of the human animal” through
political rhetoric aimed at instilling fear to combat the emergence of the communist ideology can
be viewed as a process akin to the Nazi party’s marginalization of the Jewish citizens of
Europe.48 This separation or conflict within Greek society is a product of the political fear which
is established through the state’s mechanisms of control; therefore, the imbalance between
communist versus anticommunist in Greece becomes more apparent and widely accepted despite
the implications of humanitarian violations.
With his study of fear in politics, Robin implores the reader to address the conception of
political fear with a focus into the perception of political fear by examining the “grievances and
controversies that underlie it” to situate properly fear into its political context.49 Robin asserts
that fear through political mechanisms are created through two means associated with the ruling
government. First, once the ruling class assigns specific roles through a “prism of ideas” to
mediate between what should be viewed as the “public’s chief object of fear,” the government
accomplishes the formation of what should be feared.50
After a successful socio-political division at the hands of the ruling government, political
leaders utilize the threat of political fear primarily as a means of “internal intimidation… to
ensure that one group retains… its power at the expense of another.”51 Robin contends that the
intimate link between the elite’s power to protect society and that same power to control society
is based upon a symbiotic nature that “our need for the first often bolsters our fear for the
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second.”52 Robin argues for the need of a stable, equal form of government based on “principles
of freedom and equality” in politics in order to avoid the mistake of a political foundation rooted
in the “moral and political argument” of fear.53 In post war Greece, fear was the mechanism of
oppression utilized to keep the communist threat at bay.
2.2 The Role of Terror within the Culture of Fear in Greece
After the German occupation, the main body helping to control the country was the EAM
and their military wing, ELAS. Greek collaborators with the German occupiers had to be
punished because of their lack of loyalty to Greece. Modern Greek historian Stathis N. Kalyvas,
author of “Red Terror: Leftist Violence during the Occupation” in Mark Mazower’s edited book
After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation, and State in Greece, 1943-1960,
gives a background into the period during the German occupation known as the Red Terror
perpetrated by the left against all collaborators (even those only suspected of collaboration with
the Nazi troops). What is important about this article is it gives a strong account for the era in
Greece when the left actually had a strong following due to the nature of their struggle, to free
Greece from the German occupation.
Kalyvas details a difficult period of revenge and retribution of brother against brother,
resulting in the implementation of fear by the future ruling Greek government against those
considered leftist as payback for their past aggressions. This animosity would carry on far into
the future of Greece as many would never forget this era of leftist violence known as the Red
Terror. Kalyvas’ main point in his research is to challenge the notion that the “main… victim of
violence” in Greece was not always the left by illuminating the Red Terror in Greece’s
52
53

Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 162.
Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 251.

38
historiography, hence, disputing the “meaningless partisan debate on comparative cruelty”
because “all sides (in Greece) resorted to terror” as a means for control and order.54 This
behavior of retribution was a learned behavior during the occupation only to be translated
towards the then aggressor by the collaborators after the end of the occupation.
Kalyvas argues that the success of a terror campaign is measured by the “maximum
amount of compliance” through less activity, but with terror comes the emotional feeling of
“resentment” directed towards the oppressor.55 This cycle of fear and terror seemed to reverse
roles as soon as the German occupiers’ last convoy exited Greece and the new benefactors
stepped in to instill order into the chaotic world which existed after World War II. This period of
terror began the emotional link of resentment among those not considered a communist or leftist
sympathizer leading to the period of retribution known as the White Terror. Kalyvas points out
that this era of violence started out as a means for localized conflicts to become settled within the
context of the larger violence of war and occupation.
As these “individual motivations” influenced “blood feud(s)… of individualized
retaliation and counterretaliation” many acts of violence were a direct result of the constant
presence of ELAS and their involvement in the Red Terror.56 From the ruins of a ragged Civil
War that caused both extreme physical and mental damage, Greece advanced along the path of a
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“right-wing state” that developed as an “expression of the intentions and beliefs of the victors.”57
The ruling Greek government cultivated an environment of anticommunism that sat well with the
America’s policy makers located in Greece, who in turn relayed the message of compliance
according to the anticommunist ethos instructed via Washington. After the discovery of 200 plus
bodies buried in an area once controlled by ELAS, the terror committed by the Communists prior
to the Civil War could not be denied, therefore lending credence to the fear of a complete
communist takeover and the evils that lie ahead of Greece under communism.
The corpses were discovered buried in an area “adjoining the water filter plant in the
Galatsi area” in the northern area of Athens.58 Upon discovery, the victims appeared to have
been forced to disrobe their clothing by ELAS forces before execution by various horrendous
methods; such as “hatchets, blunt instruments or stoning.”59 Among the victims, “twenty-six
persons” were “identified as members of the gendarmerie and seven members of the
metropolitan police force.”60 After the end of the Civil War, anti-communists mounted a
national campaign to keep communists from committing these atrocities from happening again to
the Greek people. This behavior of fear and calculated terror of brother against brother gave way
to an open path for the White Terror campaign. The sense of retribution and bloodshed stained
the soil of Greece, while the fear of a communist takeover only gave authority to support such
atrocities regardless of the human rights violations committed during the chaotic era in Greek
history.
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The materialization of fear in politics was readily apparent in many European countries
after World War II due to the acceptance of an adverse ideology in comparison to an accepted
norm of capitalism in countries such as Romania and East Germany.61 Through many state
mechanisms of control, the ruling elite established a culture of fear to oversee the individual in
their natural environment. Pelt discussed the fear that radiated from the ruling Greek state to the
communists and all “persons suspected of such intentions” in his study by placing the economic
rehabilitation of Greece under the watchful eye of Washington.62 He cites two main mechanisms
of fear utilized by the ruling Greek government. First, Pelt discusses the emotional existence of
terror when referring to the response of the individual from actions by the state’s apparatus of
control. The role of individual loyalty weighs heavy when discussing the personal sacrifice of
each member of Greece during the post-occupational period to the end of the dictatorship known
as the Colonel’s Junta (1967), in accordance to their role within the country. This role of state
run terror relates to the role of terror portrayed in Ardent’s model of totalitarian state fear. This
terror would create the primordial fear within the subject, thus, giving the Greek government the
opportunity to rule through the emotionality of fear.
Second, he argues that a lingering effect of the Greek Civil War was the παρακρατος or
shadow-state. The παρακρατος was originally initiated during the White Terror campaign
(1945-1946) to eliminate all areas of communist ethos from Greece, but was carried over into the
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post-Civil War period as a result of legitimacy from their benefactors in Washington. 63 This
behavior of fear through the state was established through the emotion of retribution by the anticommunists as the initiative to quell the Greek communists from gaining influence and authority
in post Civil War Greece. Pelt described this union between Washington and Athens as helping
to influence many areas of Greece’s government, and even the “Greek security apparatus proper
was modeled on US counterparts” resulting in the Κεντρικη Υπηρεσια Πληροφοριων (ΚΥΠ/KYP),
the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (May 1953).64 This direct connection between
Washington and Athens only solidifies Samatas’ argument for a police state built under Greek
McCarthyism that emerged after the Civil War.
2.3 The Path to Marginalizing the Left in Greece
What is very interesting in this case is how a fear of communism manifested itself in
Greece, despite the communists being the architects of resistance against Nazi occupation during
World War II. Greece first saw the foreign aid from the British followed by foreign aid from
Washington as a means for their economic recovery after a devastating World War II. A
telegram dated March 3rd, 1947 to United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall from Paul
Econmou-Gouras; Greece’s Minister of Foreign Affairs discusses the development of Greece’s
dependency for foreign aid in wake of the impending crisis. He stresses the “magnitude of the
difficulties” facing the nation of Greece in the midst of the Civil War due to a lack of “funds to
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finance… reconstruction” leading the Greek government “compelled to appeal to the
government of the United States… for financial, economic, and expert assistance.”65 This outcry
and dependence for economic assistance would allow Washington to act as a legitimate body
within the Greek socio-political arena. This aid from Washington gave the legitimacy needed for
Athens to deal with the communist menace by any means necessary, even if it meant the
violation of human rights against those only suspected of being communist.
On March 13th, 1947 United States Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh sent a
telegram to Marshall reiterating the “exact English translation” by then head of the Greek
government Themistocles Sofoulis, who wished to convey his “deepest gratitude for the valuable
assistance” bestowed upon Greece.66 Furthermore, MacVeagh explains that Sofoulis considered
Truman’s advice “wise… condemning the extreme of the right and left” political ideology while
stressing “a policy of toleration” in Greek politics.67 This statement shows little translation into
reality by leading Greece into a moderate, center ideological stance considering the outbreak of
terror and violence towards those associated with leftist thought. In addition, the lack of
intervention by Washington granted some form of legitimacy to the policies and directives aimed
at the persecution of the left despite the apparent and numerous accounts of human rights
violations against the Greek people.
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To stay in the good graces of their economic benefactors, the Greek government allowed
Washington to place American politicians within the Greek political infrastructure to oversee the
vast amounts of aid and to ensure it went to the proper places according to the concessions
outlined in the Truman Doctrine. This installation of fear into the Greek culture was a method
used by Washington to help solidify its place within the political pantheon of Greek reverence to
battle the hardened, evil communists. Greece was added to Washington’s “strategic global
network of bases and military agreements” in an effort to frustrate the threat of a Soviet
expansion.68 By doing so, the gateway through to the Middle East was closed to Soviet
expansion, causing a stalemate in Soviet ideology to stay influential in the Soviet Bloc area in
Eastern Europe. Washington believed that through Greece, they could establish a blue print of a
roll-back policy concerning the threat of a spreading communist ideology by further “add(ing) to
the difficulties” of Moscow’s influence in Albania and Bulgaria, plus providing Yugoslavia
“reassurance” in breaking away from Moscow.69
2.4 A New Kind of War in Post Civil War Greece
The political rhetoric used by Washington to promote directives relating to
anticommunism and anti-subversion had been established first by the policy makers in
Washington. It was designed to safe guard the United States against the internal enemy of
socialist American communist supporters. This adoption of Washington’s domestic policy by
Athens to shape post Civil War Greece was seen as a measure to assure compliance from both
sides regarding their individual requirements. Washington wanted to see Athens form a more
“moderate government” in order to lessen the “right- and left-wing polarization” which
68
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ultimately led Greece into a Civil War. In doing so, Washington believed that Greece’s
economic rehabilitation would be achieved by endorsing the formation of a “strong and stable
government in Greece.”70 This was the ultimate goal for Washington: to allow Greece to oppress
the communist supporters and thwart the crisis of a full fledged communist takeover.
The inception of intelligence gathering and covert operations became a standard
procedure for the Americans located within the borders of Greece via the concessions of the
Truman Doctrine. In a memo from the General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency
(C.I.A.) in Houston to the initial Director of Central Intelligence Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the
acceptance of “black propaganda” was seen through “two provisions” of the National Security
Act (NSA) by interpreting these provisions “as authority for (the) CIA” to engage in acts of
“subversion, confusion and political effect” in Western Europe against communism during
peacetime.71 Previously, Washington’s foreign policy did not include measures for covert
operations during peacetime in Europe. This development of covert operations led to the initial
implementation of psychological warfare in Greece to combat the internal threat of communism
within the Greek population by both Washington and Athens. The development of the Cold War
made Washington look to new ways of hindering the political left in Greece from reigning
victorious in this war of ideologies.
These actions by the CIA would have to be rooted deep within a cloak of secrecy in order
to place accountability and responsibility of their actions away from Washington. Neither
branch of the military would acknowledge any past or present operation considered to be black
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propaganda in nature. The Office of Special Operations released Directive No. 18/5 (March 29,
1948) which allowed authorization for a “Special Procedures Group… to engage in covert
psychological operations outside the United States and its possessions” in order to facilitate “in a
direction favorable to the attainment” of Washington’s direct foreign policy.72 This policy
outlined Washington’s attitude to the containment and possible roll back of communism by any
means necessary, without direct provocation against the Soviet Union during this volatile Cold
War era.
The result was the formation of the National Clandestine Service (NSC) as one of the
main components of the CIA. This branch of the United States’ government was responsible for
the covert, psychological operations aimed at the containment of Moscow’s ideological influence
under directive 10/2.73 Directive 10/2 (June 18, 1948) outlined the appointment of a “high-level
liaison officer for covert operations” who would oversee two groups of covert operational
procedures.74 First, “black propaganda” was used to aid “underground movements and promote
“resistance movements” during “peace time” in accordance with “NSC 4-A and in accordance
with the policies derived from the liaison officer.”75 Secondly, a group was to become trained
with a focus on “sabotage, anti-sabotage, (and) demolition” against the enemy only during war
time and peace time.76
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Washington’s outline for the two groups to be trained for covert, psychological warfare
during both peace time and war time would translate into various mechanisms of oppression
against the supporters of the left in Greece. These covert operations would become assimilated
into proper Greek domestic policy with the intimate relationship of the CIA and the ΚΥΠ, while
the Americans infiltrated the Greek political infrastructure. National Security Council Directive
document 292 (dated June 18, 1948), granted the CIA, via the National Security Council, with
“conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad” in accordance with
Washington’s foreign policy objectives.77 The acceptance of these covert actions on foreign soil
helped to lend credence to the belief that this Greek crisis needed immediate action to defend
democracy in this new kind of war. This focus on covert intelligence gathering was considered
the main weapon against the impending threat of a communist ideological takeover in Greece
and the security of the Free World.
These operations (June 18, 1948) were defined by policy makers as “activities” with
“minimal risk of exposure in Washington” to assure “the U.S. government can plausibly disclaim
any responsibility” or knowledge of these covert operations.78 The ultimate goal of the CIA was
the gathering of counterintelligence which would lead Washington to create a major policy
directive in Greece; the establishment of a joint security program in Athens which consisted of
two procedures. The first was the creation of a unified, strong Greek military which would be
utilized as a means to keep Greece away from the chaos and disorder lingering from the Civil
War. Second, this intelligence gathering would help with the overall development of the Greek
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national economic rehabilitation and development which in turn would be beneficial to the
restoration of an embattled Western Europe as a whole. Washington believed that the security of
the free world was dependent upon Greece’s survival as a democratic nation against the threat of
Soviet infiltration through their communist ideology.
These bilateral agreements with Greece would serve as a supportive blueprint of sorts in
future foreign policy objectives by Washington in the efforts of Soviet containment. Despite the
best laid plans in Greece, Washington knew that the Greek government was far from perfect and
needed direction at times due to its ineffective nature. Washington often criticized the various
ruling Greek governments as displaying a lack “of cohesion and unity of purpose” despite these
outcries the ruling Greek government shifted their priorities only slightly under the watchful eye
of Washington and their Greek insiders during the post-occupational era.79
This section outlined how the emotion of fear played out in the Cold War dialectic
according to the emergence of the Greek police state. This emotional oppression was
detrimental in constructing state run terror against the Greek populace. Communism was
targeted as the means to initiate these government regulations and initiatives which affected
more than just the members of the KKE. These actions against the communists authorized by
various special operations overseen by Washington in an attempt to protect the region which was
considered vital in resources and the gateway to the Middle East. Without securing Greece,
Washington feared that a lack of containment would ultimately give Moscow control over this
geo-political region.
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The following chapters will take these governmental initiatives and decrees and explain
how and why they came about into the socio-politico spectrum in Greek policies. Chapter two
will look into the secondary sources discussed previously in this chapter, such as Mogens Pelt,
Minas Samatas, and Howard Jones who discuss the policies and oppressive tactics utilized
against the communists and those suspected of the adverse ideology. While summing up the fear
that was perpetrated on the Greek populace through these oppressive means, such as the δηλωεις
and how it affected Greek society as a whole. This research will question why a government
considered to be a NATO ally would resort to tactics to that of a Soviet satellite state during the
Cold War. The Greek police state used the apparatus of government fear in order to subdue and
rid Greece of the communist ideology. This method would prove to be severe and harsh to many
Greeks regardless of their political standing.
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3
State Run Fear against Communism
“The war shattered the social fabric of life in Greece.”1
--- Judith S. Jeffery

Few Cold War historians have covered the history of the culture of fear which took place
in Greece during 1949-1974. Greek historian P.J. Vatikiotis stated that the socio-cultural product
from the occupation bred:
…instability and uncertainty… (and) economic dislocation…by the disarray of a
fractious multiparty system” thus creating “suspicion between the political forces of the
right and left, which controlled the means of state repression on one hand, and those of
the left on the other, hardened and engendered a great deal of bitterness…The American
perception of the communist menace was almost Manichean.2
Through this method of undemocratic fear tactics, the ruling anti-communist political agenda
produced a fragile, yet resistant subject forced to make decisions regarding their political beliefs
and even the safety of their families. Many Cold War historians view the Greek case as a “single
episode of the wider Cold War conflict, where the decisive factor, which determines internal
political developments, is the international balance of power.”3 Cold War historian Odd Arne
Westad described Greece as the beginning of the Cold War between the Empire of Justice and
the Empire of Liberty based on ideological differences. Westad asserted that both sides felt an
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“apocalyptic fear” that if the other side stood victorious after the Cold War.1 The late European
historian Tony Judt described the period after WWII in Europe as the battle zone for the Cold
War between the United States and Soviet Union and that Europeans “experienced quite
differently” socio-cultural life than that of those who lived in the United States and the Soviet
Union.2 This is an important fact to remember since Greece was the testing ground for this new
kind of war against an ideological enemy.
3.1 Legitimacy through Political Rhetoric under the Pretense of Democracy
Many historians focus on the political top-down debate leading to the overall picture of
the struggle between the opposing Cold War’s ideologies. Only a few have focused on the
reaction to political fear through terror, such as Greek historian Stathis N. Kalyvas who wrote on
the Red Terror (a terror campaign inflicted by the communists against those considered
collaborators with the occupational Germans and Italian fascists) that was rampant during the
occupation of Greece in World War II. Before we go into the methods utilized by the Greek
anti-communists, I shall explain the predecessor of this systematic terror campaign in which the
communists focused their efforts on those considered collaborators for the occupying Nazi
forces.3
It is imperative to stress that the efforts of the left during the occupation bred animosity
and anger among the Greeks who were marginalized by the leftist forces. Kalyvas in his
research on the Red Terror he challenges the preset notions of the main actor in the aggression
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during this era in Greek history. He states initially that his “goal is not to contribute to a
meaningless partisan debate on comparative cruelty: it is clear that all sides resorted to terror.”4
By focusing on the era known as the Red Terror, Kalyvas places this campaign in context with
the fear campaign known as the White Terror. This campaign of fear was carried out by the
persecuted Greeks of the Red Terror, as retaliation for their misery and fear conducted by the
perpetrators, the KKE.
In addition, these acts of aggression by the KKE were seen by Washington as a means of
a full fledge communist takeover after the end of German occupation. This laid the ground work
for the impending focus of foreign policy in Greece by Washington and the ruling Greek
government’s quest for the eradication of the communist ideology in Greece. Here Kalyvas
argues that “a full understanding” into the various “dynamics of violence” that occurred during
the Greek Civil War:
can only come from a comprehensive analysis that links the uses of terror by various
political actors; the integration of single isolated events into the entire sequence to which
they belong; and the combination of man different bodies of evidence.5

His research places the onset of the culture of fear in Greece and its manifestation from a
simple, but complex case of bad blood between communists and collaborators into a more
methodical, advanced system of terror tactics. These tactics were aimed at the feeling of
retribution for past misdeeds which led to the total destruction of the adverse political faction of
communism and its followers. His argument delivers a crucial point that regardless of
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Washington’s foreign investment to the Greek crisis, the state operated White Terror towards the
communist party would have manifested itself nonetheless.
My challenge to his research is to question at what rate this fear would have been
accepted by the Greek population and to the outside world without acceptance by Washington’s
foreign policy. By arguing that this culture of fear was created out of the horrid memories of the
Red Terror, leads my study to a valid point in Kalyvas’ research. The complicit nature of
Washington’s foreign policies in Athens makes me question how successful would this
communist witch hunt have been without Washington’s aid (monetary and materiel) and the
personnel lent to Athens.
Kaylvas illustrates a campaign of terror by EAM that produced a sense of great fear in the
Greek communities. Distrust and suspicions of one’s neighbor ran rampant from family to
family within the Greek villages and towns. Kalyvas furthers his argument by stating that
“successful terror is intended to achieve maximum amounts of compliance with a minimum of
amount of violence. Yet, terror also produces resentment.”6 He argued this system of terror’s
main “goal was to ensure civilian compliance and maximize control over the population.”7 This
formula would be later used by the ruling Greek government against their enemy, the Greek
communists and those suspected of the adverse ideology. This pretext for the era known as the
White Terror bred many harsh memories of past indiscretions of terror unleashed upon the Greek
populace. Lest we forget how Arendt’s research argues that through state terror, the state
controls not only the people’s actions but also how the people react as well.
6
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After liberation, Greece went through a maelstrom of emotional and physical turmoil as
the two sides battled over the inevitable control of Greece. Greek political scientist Minas
Samatas completed a comparative study on the “post-war political repression in Greece and in
the United States of America” by linking the “anticommunist crusades” to the Truman Doctrine,
which are “considered democratic operations defending democracy against an international
communist conspiracy.”8 Greek historian Nikos Alivizatos argues that the demonstration of
“American loyalty” was brought to the Greek populace through Greek legislation and directives
that hid under the guise of “Greek law-abiding mindedness.”9 Those considered to be lawabiding by these set guidelines were issued πιστοποιητικο κοινωνικων φρονηματων “Certificate
social conscience” to be carried10 around at all times as a sense of identity within this –“us”
versus “them” dialectic of political ideologies.11 Instead of setting reforms and democratizing
Greece, Washington’s intervention bolstered the Greek right-wing establishment, including the
monarchy and the military, intensified political divisions, and set the stage for the impending
military dictatorship of the Greek Junta (1967-1974).
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The communist threat to Greece, internal as well as external, was egregiously
exaggerated and the governmental measures taken to combat this ideology were socially counterproductive. Initially, Washington’s foremost objective in the Greek crisis was outlined as a
method to create “a peaceful Greece which would not invite communist activity through social
and economic disorder.”12 But as the Cold War progressed and evolved, Washington’s role in
Greece became more and more muddled and “infinitely… complicated.”13 It was easy after the
devastation of both the occupation and Civil War in Greece for the right-wing influence to
permeate successfully throughout society. This shift was brought about by a numbness and
desensitization of the Greek socio-cultural ethos at the hands of “the prevailing sense of fear,
grief, and conflict” which led to “the worst hunger and deprivation” in Greece in modern times.14
3.2 Greek-McCarthyism as a Means to Legitimize Oppressive Legislation
This part of chapter two will explore Greek historian Minas Samatas’s research in order
to examine the political experience in this Greek culture of fear and the politics that grew from
this socio-political movement. Samatas’ study on the comparative qualities of Greek and United
States’ McCarthyism will help to illuminate the political approach through legitimacy of political
rhetoric which was used to oppress the communist ideology in Greece. Samatas’ study into the
political oppression of suspected communists in both the United States and Greece will help
illustrate the pre-existing political rhetoric which was used later to formulate the new repressive
policies of the ruling anti-communist Greek faction.
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In post-occupation Greece, Samatas looks closely at the role that a subject’s personal and
political loyalty to Greece played out within the context of a culture of fear in Greek culture.
Samatas examines the role of the Πιστοπουτικα Κοινονικον Φρονιματον/ civic-mindedness
certificates and the διλωεις/loyalty statements utilized as a means of marginalization by the anticommunist government in Greece. An excerpt taken from a statement from Constantine
Maniadakis, who was a trusted officer in the Greek army during the Metaxas regime, describes
the process of “certification” as a non-Communist:
a chronological account of his Communist activities, with all the names of those who
initiated him in the Communist ideology, an account of all party meetings he had
attended, the position he occupied in the party hierarchy, and any of his non-party
activities such as participation in the ‘Workers Assistance’, the Communist Youth
Organization OKNE, the trade union fractions, or the army fractions.15
During the Metaxas regime (1936-1941), “almost 45,000 such declarations” were
authorized and published in an effort to combat the spread of Communism despite this number
“far exceeding the actual membership” of the KKE at this time.16 This proved to be an effective
method that would later be used after the occupation of Greece in order to erase the power and
authority of the KKE in Greece. According to Pelt, “the legal framework established during the
Civil War constituted an important element of continuity stemming from the inter-war years and
especially from the Metaxas period.”17 Anti-communist legislation performed an essential role
in the “coherence of the Right from the Metaxas dictatorship onwards,” while “anti-communism
offered former collaborators a safe entry into state service (post-Occupation).”18
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Washington’s monetary assistance and governmental legitimacy was bestowed upon
Athens under the pretense of curbing Moscow’s influence in the region. Washington officials
allowed the recycling of pre-occupation, anti-communist legislation regardless of the sociopolitical outcome. According to Greek government reports during 1945, “over 80,000 people
were prosecuted” and placed in over-crowded jails across Greece for communist related offences
against the Greek government.19 Other Greek government reports admitted in October 1949 that
since June 1, 1946, “3,150 persons had been sentenced to death for aiding or taking part in the
revolt, of whom 1,233 had been executed.”20 Many Greeks were sent to “reindoctrination
centres” such as the islands of Makronisos and Leros, in an effort to “convert Communist
elements into good citizens” based on the ruling Greek governments method of “lectures and
physical training” in addition to the degradation of the meager living conditions on these
reindoctrination centres.21 These statistics place in historical context the degree of persecution
and oppressive mechanisms of control used to marginalize those considered to be communists.
According to a report by the KKE, in September 1947, “19,620 political prisoners and
36,948 political exiles” were sent to these reindoctrination centres in the Greek islands.22 In a
document from Athens to Washington dated June 1948, “12,695 political prisoners, in addition
to 10,635 individuals in exile and 15,242 (were) interned at Makronisos.”23 By August 1949, a
memorandum from the Greek government stated that there were “31,400 individuals in camps
19
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and exile, and 18,000 in prison.”24 The abundant number of prisoners only exacerbates the
degree of over-crowding allowed in these make-shift prison camps. While the validity of these
numbers may be in question, it is safe to assume that regardless of the actual numbers of political
prisoners and exiles was extremely high in accordance to the actual members of the KKE. These
numbers set to show the massive influx of those suspected and known Greek communists after
the occupation. Regardless of the actual numbers, these camps operated for one reason: the
sterilization of the Greek communist into a model Greek citizen according to the Greek
government.
Greek historian Polymeris Voglis argued that “the formation of the subject and its
identity is a process” which may start for many while imprisoned on these islands.25 The
persecuted Greek subject is forced to identify himself as a political prisoner, these Greeks felt
betrayed by their own government again as they were branded “criminals” in an effort to obscure
the real reason of differing ideological beliefs being the main factor.26 Voglis argues that
through shared experiences from the past occupation and the Civil War, many Greek political
prisoners formed an identity through the “constructed… shared, glorious and undisputed past…
exemplified by posters of EAM on the walls, and the experience of persecution after liberation…
shaped their identity.”27 Voglis argued that within the context of the Greek Civil War, Greece
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was “divided between nationally-minded citizens and bandits, there was little room left inbetween” for any other description to signify the Greek populace.28
Voglis also argues that the “…success of this process of cultural transformation” was
contingent upon the duration of time spent in the reindoctrination centres and the specific
“conditions”, thus, the “prison experience was a transit experience, while for others it left
indelible marks.”29 Marginalized communists dealt with mental and physical abuse by their
captors in order to rehabilitate them into becoming what anti-communists believed to be as an
ideal Greek citizen. On the other side of the spectrum, the Greek “right-wing rhetoric was based
on specific political aims and did not primarily seek to construct and project an individual
political and cultural identity” like their opponents.30 To the ruling Greek right, “nationalism and
anticommunism went hand in hand” in regards to their ultimate goal of ridding Greece of any
communist influence and ruling Greece.31 This method of hindering a complete communist
takeover wrapped in the guise of ideological differences would ultimately divide Greece for
many years to come. Brother against brother, divided through the adherence of ideological
differences, ripped the very social fabric of Greece in half.
3.3 The Emergence of Preventive Law
Samatas argues that the importance of the economic rehabilitation mission in Greece was
imperative to the overall outcome of the Cold War and the future of the European economy.
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Failure was not an option to Washington’s policy-makers regarding this issue. To provide the
best possible means for success in Greece, Washington chose to project “the image of a great,
united national struggle against the heinous Greek communists” in order to foster participation
and support, not just within Greece but worldwide.32 By doing so, this helped cultivate the
culture of fear in Greece by giving the legitimacy to marginalize the KKE and its followers
through these oppressive policies enacted by the anti-communists. In addition, this created a
rigid dichotomy within the socio-political sphere between anticommunists (them) and
communists (us).
Samatas argues that the anti-communist crusade was enforced through specific “special
paraconstitutional legislation” that focused on scrutinizing the “individual’s life” for any signs of
“wrong-thinking that might result in future wrong-doing.”33 This illustrates how the Greek
populace feared the possibility of becoming a dissident to the Greek government not by their
actions, but by what they could “potentially” achieve as communists.34 The Greek government
turned to their newly developed technique of marginalization through a process called
“preventive law” as a method to utilize the paraconstitutional legislation in place by ignoring the
“civil liberties” of many Greeks accused of being a communist.35 Samatas argues that this is a
method used by Washington during the McCarthy era but dates back to the seventeenth century.
“The establishment of this thought-crime, guilt by association, and collective responsibility by
32
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U.S. and Greek anticommunist states is reminiscent of the heresy-hunts and other ideological
warfare methods of the seventeenth century.”36 This learned behavior of retribution was not only
accepted by Washington, but was considered to be major foreign policy advancement to fulfill
the order to protect democracy in Greece.
The adoption of Washington’s model against communism was no coincidence by any
means. Failure by Washington in post-occupation Greece was not an option with the looming
menace of the Soviet Union growing more dangerous by the day. Washington hoped to win a
“victory against the Soviet Union and its allies” resulting in the restriction of the “conspiratorial
efforts to subvert and incorporate” Greece into a communist state and the establishment of “an
obedient Greek anticommunist state… ensuring U.S. strategic interests.”37 The purging of the
Greek civil service by the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) after the Truman
Doctrine was a direct result in adopting “U.S. ideological warfare technology and indoctrination
techniques” and a restructured Greek “security apparatus” much like its predecessor in
Washington in an effort to combat the communist ideological menace.38 Samatas argues that
three measures taken by Washington’s policy makers mirrored future Greek paraconstitutional
legislation enacted against the threat of communism.
Samatas contends that the Greek model of the United State’s Hatch Act of August 2,
1939, was translated into the Greek emergency laws 512 (1948), 516 (1948) and law 1540
(1950). Samatas argues that these laws “restated almost verbatim” Washington’s prevention of
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“pernicious political activities” and the illegalization of “a party or organization which supported
the overthrow of the U.S. constitutional political system.”39 In agreement with the Hatch Act
and the Smith Act, the U.S. Civil Service Circular 222 (June 20, 1940) outlawed the
“participation in or affiliation” with any communist, Nazi or fascist political parties or
organizations.40 Also, Samatas lists the Loyalty Order of March 21, 1947 (Executive Order
9835) issued by President Truman, which prompted “over three million loyalty investigations by
the both the House Un-American Activities Committee and Civil Service loyalty boards.”41
Samatas argues that these U.S. laws were incorporated into the Greek legislation and
governmental initiatives which “introduced the fundamental concepts of loyalty (νομμοφροσυνη)
and disloyalty” by legitimizing “a repressive apparatus which judged an employee’s current
loyalty on the basis of his previous associations, activities, and beliefs.”42 These laws helped
place the Greek citizen into two categories; loyal to the state or an enemy of the state.
Previous Greek legislation from the Metaxas regime (Espionage Law 375 and Law 4229)
played an important part in this attempt to squash the communist ideology as it was recreated
with the introduction of Greek Law 1612 (December 31, 1950). This was the final piece of
legislation which would give the Greek government the ultimate control over suspected
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communists.43 Greek historian Jon V. Kofas argued that Washington’s willingness to “foster a
culture of militarism” in Greece helped to create a mirror image of the Central Intelligence
Agency (C.I.A.) in Greece, thus, creating a clear path for Washington to intervene in Greek
politics under the guise of prominent Greek legislation and governmental initiatives.44
The Greek domestic security apparatus, Εθνικη Υπηρεσια Πληροφοριων/KYP, did
participate in a massive full-scale “wiretapping and mail opening” of suspected communists
across Greece.45 The KYP would act as the agent of fear to those under the watchful eye of the
Greek government during this oppressive era. Their covert operations would instill the emotion
of fear within the Greek population as their actions forced many Greeks to look over their
shoulder before saying or doing anything which may seem as a communist influenced act. The
Greek citizen feared being spied on by not only the KYP, but informers disguised as their
neighbors as well.
Samatas ends his discussion of the similarities of the two domestic security apparatuses
by stating, “the value of propaganda as a weapon of war and politics should need no
argument.”46 Law 4229 (July 25, 1929), which was better known as the idionymo law,
criminalized the communist ideology without banning the political party itself. This was the
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institution of the “thought crime” into the Greek domestic security mechanisms aimed at the
oppression of the communist ideology by “legalizing state anticommunist terrorism from that
time forward.”47 In December 1947, Greek Law 509 was put into effect criminalizing the
communist party in the Greek political spheres and thus banning the party from any and all
political activity in Greece. The outlawing of communism as an ideological enemy became
germane to the safety of Greece as a democracy under the auspices of the Cold War.
Although Greek law 509 was later replaced with a newer version which “extended its
definition of seditious activity” through the marginalization of the Greek communists, the close
surveillance of Greek communists remained a top priority.48 Samatas describes other forms of
the Greek domestic security mechanisms which would form this Greek culture of fear:
1. the “systematic surveillance of all citizens”
2. the use of the civic-mindedness certificates/Πιστοπουτικα Κοινονικον
Φρονεματον “based on their surveillance records”
3. the use of the so-called repentance statements/δνλωσεις “required of all political
prisoners, or of anyone wishing to be cleared of a communist stigma”
4. mass deportations for the “reconversion” of suspected and known Greek
communists with the use of “physical and psychological terror”
5. and the establishment of a “militarized” zone against the threat of the “internal
enemies” with the use of “physical and psychological repression.”49
Dividing the Greek society into nationalists and communists became the foundation of
establishing a legal framework of prosecuting communists within a right-wing conservative
socio-political spectrum in the elections of March 1946. These measures against communism in
Greece led to a division in loyalties within the Greek socio-political sphere, thus resulting in the
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subsequent rankings of Greek citizenship outline by Samatas as being either Εθνικοφρονες-loyal
to Greece or Μιασμα- those considered to be disloyal or suspected of communist associations.
The institution of the Πιστοπουτικα Κοινονικον Φρονεματον (civic-mindedness certificates) gave
way to the bureaucratic side of this ideological disagreement as it focused mainly on the “paper
world” of the specific Greek citizen more than the actual “citizen himself.”50 These documents
show the extreme depths used in order for the Greek security apparatus to keep a watchful eye on
suspected dissidents in Greece. By using these certificates as a form of oppressive state control,
the Greek government controlled all aspects of social life for the Greek populace.
“Like all totalitarian and police states”, Greece kept extensive files on every “individual
citizen” under their political affiliation and activities by intruding into their “private lives” and
the “inherent power of the Greek state to blackmail its citizens accordingly.”51 As discussed in
chapter one, Greece had become a source of police informers to the state apparatus with
“60,000” Greeks on secret payrolls in 1962, thus creating a “parasitic, insecure class of rentiers
who lived off state subsidies and revenues, dependent on the state for protection and support.”52
This would ultimately cause a sea of distrust in the Greek populace, which subsequently led to
the culture of fear in Greece due to the state apparatus utilizing their state informers as a
mechanism of control and oppression.
Those who were suspected of communism but refused to sign a repentance statement
were forced to undergo a process called Αποχροματισμος. This was a “political decolorization or
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de-stigmatization procedure… required of all reconverted ex-communists” in order to be
considered safe for repopulation back into Greece.53 Samatas describes the term decolorization
as being;
based on the fact that police used to underline with a red pen all critical personal data—
true or false, it’s irrelevant—in the files of the citizens )and their relatives) who had been
stigmatized as communist, leftist, sympathizer, or crypto.54
Samatas argues that these techniques illustrate the basic formula used by Greece and its
benefactor, Washington in the instrumentation of Greek McCarthyism. The validation of GreekMcCarthyism “became a defensive weapon for the consolidation and reinforcement of an
anticommunist state” within Greece as a necessary policy for the punishment and the politicoeconomic exclusion of the vanquished Greek left.”55 The key point to take from Samatas’
argument into Greek McCarthyism is that, despite being a carbon copy of Washington’s
McCarthy era politics, “Greek McCarthyism was far more repressive and violent” than the U.S.
version.56 This statement by Samatas intrigued me to focus on this subject of GreekMcCarthyism due to the extreme nature that was made in Greece to thwart any Soviet
advancement or interference in the region.
The acceptance and legitimization given to Greece intrigued me to look further as to why
this was accepted in what was called a democratic nation. Samatas does admit that despite the
efforts of Greek-McCarthyism, the Greek left survived through the means of “new political
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forces” and, in fact, “remnants of many repressive controls and discrimination against the left
strengthened the opposition leftist forces” in Greece.57 This anticommunist crusade did more
than just target the adverse ideology of communism as anti-Greek, but it assisted in the formation
and division of “first- and second- class Greek citizens,” and “it perpetuated the traditional
mistrust and cleavage between a state and its citizenry” of Greece.58 This socio-political schism
would reverberate until the late 1970’s when Greece would become frustrated at the hands of the
ruling Greek Colonel’s Junta.
European historian Mogens Pelt produced an astounding study into the international relations
between the United States, Greece and West Germany (1949-1974) in hopes to illustrate how
Greece was attached to the West through diplomatic and economic-political relations. This study
addresses the issue of burden-sharing and how it relates to “Washington’s demands on its
European allies to shoulder a larger share of the expenditures related to a common defence (sic)
against” Moscow.59 This issue of burden sharing explains how Washington would allow such
actions in Greece to aid the quest for the marginalization of communism. Pelt describes burdensharing as the process of relinquishing their role as Greece’s benefactor and transferring the
responsibility to the West Germans.
According to Pelt, “after the Civil War and in the wake of the Korean War,” Washington
“decided” no more foreign aid was to be sent to Athens in hopes to “support the long-term
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economic development of Greece.”60 This decision came with the political fervor, that through
West Germany’s growth and survival, “American interests” would be served best in the area.61
Through a policy of deferment towards Communist policies, Washington hoped to maintain
Greece as a geopolitical location in regards to the Middle East—and keeping all Soviet influence
away from the region. By initializing this foreign policy in Greece through the creation of the
Truman Doctrine, the impetus for the Cold War had begun and “marks the point at which
American leadership began to link the divergences between East and West ideology and not to
Russian imperialism.”62
Washington believed the overall threat “perceived” from Moscow in the region came from
the “instability” of the area’s “economic, social, and political” woes which could lead Greece to
succumb and accept aid from the Communists or Soviet Bloc countries.63 In order to maintain
Greece’s freedom from Moscow’s influence, Washington wanted a “strong, moderate
government” to maintain stability and economic rehabilitation through US funds.64 With the
Korean War emerging in the wake of the Cold War, Washington shifted its direction to a “rightwing rule” to govern Greece and keep her free of Soviet pressure.65 Pelt argues a similar thesis
from fellow Greek historian Howard Jones, Greece served as a blueprint in the “rollback” of any
60
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suspected or known Communist advance within the region or the Middle East.66 This was a new
frontier for Washington as it tried effortlessly to keep Greece democratic by any means
necessary. New policies and adaptation to this Cold War led Washington to establish Greece as
the testing grounds to battle the communist ideology.
3.4 Refocusing the Role of Greece in the Cold War Context
The importance of Greece during the Cold War is argued by many historians, but the
importance in the Cold War narrative is often straight-laced, painting Greece as the landing zone
for the Cold War animosity. But if we re-examine Greece in the context of their Cold War
policies, Greece may seem similar to the narrative of many Iron Curtain countries. This reexamination of historical context can make clear how post-Civil War Greece developed as a
democratic nation yet a nation with many sobering secrets. The breadth of Cold War
historiography leans towards mentioning Greece as important during the Truman era but wanes
as future administrations focused on the Middle East and their geopolitical importance in the
region during the Cold War. Some Modern Greek historians’ focus their research on the debate
concerning the validity of terror and fear which emanated from the ruling Greek government’s
directives and policies from a top-down approach.
Much of the recent scholarship delving into the past of Greece focuses on diplomatic
relations, economic stagnation, foreign intervention by the United States or Great Britain, and
internal strife relating to the anticommunist movement in Greece. The willful acceptance of
Washington concerning Greece’s turn towards a right-wing rule over its populace gave way to a
rampant wave of anti-communism linked to many governmental decrees and legislation aimed at
66
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the overall destruction of anything dealing with the communist ideology. By the early part of the
1960s, economic aid to Athens had been terminated by Washington as a result of Washington’s
“commitments world-wide and the fact that the… economy was under an increasing strain.”67
This shift in foreign policy by Washington gave way to their plan of burden sharing for West
Germany to accept the role of Greece’s benefactor.
By re-examining the issue in Greece, I wish to challenge the preconceived notion that Greece
and the United States entered into this diplomatic arrangement with only the intentions of
containing communism. The scope of my research into this subject will concentrate on how the
role of political fear in Greek society, through government legislation and political rhetoric,
played out in the larger Cold War dialogue between the anti-communist Greek government and
the surviving communists in Greece. This re-contextualizing of the Greek crisis and the Cold
War will hopefully bring more awareness to the early dawn of this ideological war against
communism. Washington’s complicit nature regarding the diplomatic relations with the ruling,
ineffective right-wing Greek influenced leadership, and a form of legitimacy that granted
credence to this repressive nature of political rhetoric directed at the destruction of the
Communist party. In other words, it was accepted to fight fear with fear through the means of
marginalization of those suspected or considered to be communist across the globe.
Through this method of undemocratic fear tactics, the ruling anti-communist political agenda
produced a fragile, yet resistant subject forced to make decisions regarding their political beliefs
and the safety of their families. Instead a focus needs to be on the “ideological and political
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origins” of the Cold War outside Washington and Moscow.68 By examining the shifting
ideology of Washington’s initial focus of rehabilitation onto the ideology of the “colonial
experience”, the act of neo-colonialism and marginalizing the Greek left was achieved by
political rhetoric aimed against those who held the communist ideology steadfast.69
Many Cold War historians describe this moment when the United States began to mix its
foreign policy with interventionist policies and directives aimed at keeping a neo-colonial
approach to how their aid was distributed throughout the receiving country’s budget and
economic rehabilitation. Historian Amikam Nachmani argues that the Greek Civil War was a
method for the two Super Powers to “tie up the loose ends of their spoils-of-war agreements”
post World War II with the “monarcho-fascists and bandits” of Greece fighting this proxy war,
which he considers “one the greatest” of the twentieth century civil wars.70 Nachmani also
contends that the Civil War “ended” as a result of an American neo-colonialization of Greece’s
political infrastructure and without this intervention, the Civil War “might have been shorter, its
casualties fewer, and its outcome different.”71
Greek politicians would prove to be most ambitious, and at times very opportunistic as well
as those in Washington, with the Greek government’s endorsement of cruel tactics and harsh
techniques of torture resulting in the decimation of the communists. The banning of all political
rhetoric and operations of the KKE as a political party, as well as any communist ideology, was
seen as part of the White Terror campaign in Greece. United States transnational historian
68

Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 4.
69
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.
70
Amikam Nachmani, Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-49, Journal of Contemporary History,
Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), P. 489-522, Sage Publications, Ltd.: 489-491.
71
Amikam Nachmani, Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-4, Journal of Contemporary History,
Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), P. 489-522, Sage Publications, Ltd.: 496.

71
Howard Jones, author of A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman
Doctrine in Greece, looks into the overall process that Washington formulated in order to
combat the threat of communism in Europe and how this affects the safety of the free world.
By adhering to the belief of the Soviet Union’s imminent expansion into the Mediterranean,
Washington utilized this as a focal point to the crisis in Greece and its “global importance” to the
Cold War narrative.72 The use of Jones’ study will show how the Greek cause was justified in
Washington by stating that the Greek people “wanted American help.”73 As a consequence of
this request, a new kind of war was developed during peacetime in Europe which created a new
global strategy for future foreign policy objectives by Washington. According to Jones, through
the rationalization of a culture of fear, Washington helped to develop this modernist ideological
war against communism to combat such a “complex situation” in Greece.74
The communist ideology would be handled in a manner that could be considered delicate in
regards to the diplomatic situation between Washington and Athens in a global scope.75 These
policies established a method of control over the Greek governmental infrastructure; Washington
realized the importance of keeping Greece a democracy amidst the fear of Moscow’s slowly
placing its influence into democratic Greece. As a point to the free world, Washington decided
that democracy would champion this war against the communist intrusion with new tactics and a
total revamping of the Greek bureaucratic system. In doing so, the influence of the Washington
insiders into the Greek political sphere held a heavy hand in the creation of many governmental
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Greek agencies and policies. These policies would develop into the oppressive forms of
marginalizing the communists, as discussed by Samatas, within the Greek society.
Jones’ research gives credence to the numerous government documents and memoirs which
state that new covert, psychological operations during peacetime would be implemented in the
struggle to maintain a free, democratic Greece. In addition, Jones’ research will assist the
narrative by putting into context the difficulty of the situation in Greece to Washington. This
heroic effort undertaken under the name of freedom was used to marginalize those who were
supposed to be protected under a true, democratic institution. Jones is detrimental to
understanding how this moment in history should be viewed as a major area of diplomatic
change in Washington’s “global strategy”, plus as a crucial period for “safeguarding America’s
security and prestige” in the eyes of Washington against the evils of Moscow.76
Jones goes great lengths to expose Washington’s deliberate intentions in Greece by
illustrating their interference/intervention in order to establish a rejuvenated Greek economy and
legitimizing a heavily right-wing influenced military dominated society. The success of Greece
was viewed as being “peripheral” to the danger of combating communism in post-war Europe by
Washington’s policy-makers.77 Both sides view this as the best route to solve the peril in postoccupied Greece and the aftermath of the Civil War which demolished Greece’s infrastructure.
Washington’s aim was influenced heavily by social propaganda in the form of romanticist prose
which helped to influence the cry for action in the devastated war torn Greece. American
historian John Gunther wrote:
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Let nobody write about Greece lightly. Here is one of the most tragic and painful
situations in the world. What is going on in Greece today is real war, though the fighting
is desultory and the casualties comparatively light – what is worse, civil war, the most
ravaging of all kinds of war. Moreover this is not merely a Greek war but an American
war; it is the Americans who make it possible to fight it. Athens is almost like an AngloAmerican (mostly American) armed citadel, and neither the Greek army nor government
could survive then days without aid – concrete military aid – from the United States. Not
one American citizen in a thousand has any conception of the extent of the American
commitment in Greece, the immensity of the American contribution, and the stubborn
and perhaps insoluble dilemma into which we – the United States – have plunged
ourselves.78
Gunther speaks of Athens as being a Anglo-American armed citadel which is solely
supported with the aid from Washington in order to serve as a proxy army for the United States.
This is the same argument that Westad gives when he states that the Cold War was not fought on
either Washington or Moscow’s soil, but on the soil of other nations which served as surrogates
for this embattled Cold War. This excerpt was taken from Gunther’s research completed after
World War II and still many historians continued to focus on the Cold War as a merely an
ideological battle between the two super powers. The real soldiers of the Cold War were the
occupants of regional geopolitical areas which the Super Powers aspired to place their neocolonial influence into in order keep the other power at bay. Gunther acknowledges that many
American citizens do not have any indication of the full extent of influence which Washington
has instilled into Greece during this era. Those that are aware see it merely as a means to thwart
a communist takeover through the Cold War dialectic. But Gunther tells the reader to understand
that all actions in Greece carry consequences and that these consequences carry a profound price.
This price would eventually be fully understood when the stories of the παρακρατος became
more prevalent in the American media.
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“Postwar circumstances” compelled the Truman administration to expound a broader
sense in their definition of vested, geopolitical strategic interests.79 This would help place the
need for Washington’s foreign aid (economic, military and social) in Greece regardless of its
consequences. This Greek crisis was dire in scope and needed a fully fledged plan of direct
action by Washington in order to revive the democratic institution in Athens. It was a firm belief
within the Truman administration that the “failure to defend Greece… would demoralize other
nations and force them to either to accept communism or to buy peace by making concessions to
totalitarianism.”80 Jones states that this Greek crisis was viewed by the Truman administration
as “an unpromising place to make a stand” for the security of all democratic nations across the
globe.81
The assumption that the Greek people “were resilient and, for the most part, not attracted
by communist ideology… (and) Most important, they wanted American help” aided Washington
to develop this formidable policy.82 This policy “would be flexible enough to handle all
contingencies and yet be sufficiently restrained to prevent local conflict from erupting into full
scale war… The civil war in Greece provided the first battle field for this new kind of war.”83
Jones contends as the Cold War continued to become more and more prevalent in daily political

79

Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 4.
80
Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 4.
81
Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 15.
82
Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 15.
83
Howard Jones, A New Kind of War: America’s Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in Greece (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 15.

75
discussions, the need for “democratic methods” became less and less accepted in order to evolve
with the “variables essential to victory” against the communist menace.84
Jones contends that the after-math of the Greek Civil War led to a deep-rooted animosity
from the “vendetta-like character of the conflict resulted in atrocities by both sides that assured
(the) lasting bitterness.”85 This link between the emotions of retribution harkens back to
Kalyvas’ research of terror inflicted upon the aggressor by the victim. The dangers of this new
kind of war was reflected in Washington’s assumption that much of the blame within the Greek
crisis could be linked to the “longstanding Balkan problems” which “injected further
complexities into the Greek situation” with no clear path to a solution.86 Jones concludes that the
overall outcome was beneficial for both the governments in Athens and Washington. Jones
argues that the experienced gained in Greece would “provide a glimmer of policy that would
become known… as nation building” which would trickle down to the rest of postwar Europe.87
This study helps show the extent of methods and doctrines in Greece which became precedents
for Washington’s future foreign intervention in the Vietnam conflict (via his thesis for the United
State’s blue print for the Cold War).
This new direction in combating communism would help to develop the intimate relation
between the C.I.A. and the emerging Greek agency the K.Y.P. in order to wage war against the
left with covert operations. The C.I.A saw the broader picture when it was concerned with the
Greek crisis. A communist victory in Greece would cause “international panic” and a “greater
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risk of collision” with the Soviets by exerting pressure on Washington to extend more foreign aid
to countries in trouble.88 The Office of Naval Intelligence concluded that the fall of Greece
would be an “example of the futility” of Washington’s foreign policy and would have “major
impact on the political direction of Europe and the Near East.”89 This new kind of war in Greece
helped develop both internal and external policies for both Washington and Athens alike.
By using such historians as Samatas, Jones, Kalyvas, and Pelt to revise our understanding
of Greece within the Cold War, this thesis has argued for historians to refocus their research of
Greece and their stark similarities to those of Soviet bloc countries. The Greek παρακρατος
treated its populace to state run fear in order to rid the country of the communist menace. This
revision of Cold War research brings the role of Greece into the forefront of how Washington
dealt with Moscow without using such means that would incite a global conflict. Instead,
Washington developed a new kind of war against this ideological enemy called communism.
The use of political rhetoric as a means to define nationalists and non-nationalists alike within
the Greek political sphere gave way for a complete right-wing takeover of the nation of Greece.
With the assistance of Washington, new laws were renamed and instituted in an effort to curb the
threat of a communist takeover in Greece.
This chapter illustrated what these laws defined and how they affected Greek society if
you were considered an enemy of the state. The following chapter will now explore the means
of validation and how the Greek government handled this ideological conflict in Greece. By
using primary sources from both Greece and the United States, chapter three will give the reader
a road map to the validity acquired by the Greek government by Washington in an effort to quell
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this ideological conflict by any means necessary. Chapter three will discuss such topics as the
diplomatic correspondence between Greek officials to Washington officials pleading for
monetary and materiel assistance. The institution of the C.I.A.’s covert operations in Greece as a
means to battle this adverse ideology during peacetime in Europe will help exemplify the
argument that both the Greek and United States governments viewed this ideological conflict as
a means to institute new methods in battling the communist influence in the region.
Furthermore, chapter three will help place the role of Washington’s influence in the
proper context which guided the Greek government to take a common authoritative stance
against suspected communists in Greece despite the implications of numerous human rights
abuses. These systematic adaptations to Greek policies through Washington’s influence prove
that they acted from this point forward in a complicit nature regarding the direction of the
oppressive police state in Greece. Through the emotion of fear, Greek politics stressed loyalty to
the country first and foremost without any allusion to ideologies outside the accepted norm of
anticommunism. Chapter three will go further into the role these centers to illustrate how they
were seen in the context of the Cold War and the crusade to keep Greece democratic.
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4
Greece under Fire: The Dangers of a Communist Takeover
Washington knew that the gateway to the Middle East and its geopolitical global
importance was at stake in post World War II Greece. With prior knowledge that British aid was
depleting quickly for Greece, Washington knew it had to act swiftly in order to protect its
geopolitical interests. To secure the Mediterranean region, Washington needed to take action to
acquire the Greek people’s allegiance to the Western powers at the onset of the impending Cold
War. In order to do so, Washington had to sway public opinion that the Greek crisis was indeed
a vital issue that all free peoples must undertake to protect this region from the Soviets and the
communist ideology. Print media and editorials would help validate newly formed government
initiatives to be utilized to aid Washington in its effort to promote democracy in Greece. To
promote these ideals of an impending crisis in Greece, the current political climate had to be reimagined by placing EAM as an enemy of the state to the world, as well as to Greece. Panos
Morphopulos, a prominent right Greek activist, in an editorial of the New Republic (1944)
warned of an imminent threat of Greek communists seizing power and establishing a
dictatorship. Morphopulos stated that after they had “started a national resistance movement”
while “under this guise” would possibly gain “the confidence and support” of the Greek people.1
This would lead to the ultimate control of the Greek government by the communist party with
little chance of a democratic recovery.
President Truman warned that action must been taken in Greece immediately before “the
familiar Communist pattern of planned chaos – ruin or rule” is enacted in its “most vicious form”
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in the region.2 Truman understood that without swift and decisive action by Washington, Greece
would succumb to the temptation of aid and support from the neighboring Soviets. If the Soviet
plan became reality, Truman felt the entire region would then fall victim to the Empire of Justice.
Truman would further add that the only way to make the mission in Greece successful was to
have “internal security” without the threat of communist influence.3 This call for internal
security would give acceptance for Washington administrators in the Athens government and
eventually clandestine operations to safe guard Greece from any and all communist activity.
This crisis in Greece was exacerbated with such articles like Dana Adams Schmidt’s “General
Decline is seen in Greece” which appeared in the New York Times. Schmidt stated that the state
of affairs in Greece was “deteriorating” and that the Greek “people are frightened” with the
looming threat of the communist influence.4 A failing Greek economy, empty shelves in Greek
supermarkets, and the loss of the Greek import/export market only made the communist crisis
seem more realistic to the Western media. Schmidt would further add that without the assistance
by Washington, “matters would probably be worse than they are” in Greece, thus, granting the
communist influence easier access to important roles within the government.5 These kinds of
reports concerning the peril in Greece helped solidify the urgent need for Washington to act
quickly and justly.
In a memorandum sent from the Greek government dated May 22, 1947 (three months
after the abrupt announcement by the British that they would be pulling out of Greece), the
“hearts of the Greek people” had been “profoundly touched” by the initiative undertaken by
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Washington in lieu of this Greek crisis.6 This memo gave “assurances” to Washington that “any
assistance… will be used in conformance” as dictated by Washington officials according to the
rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine.7 This “great and continuous effort” by the Greek government
to “lead its people in an effort to achieve” the goals set by Washington gave a sense of
legitimacy to the preset notions of the dangers of the communist ideology.8 Consequently, after
the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the Greek government declared that both Washington
and Athens should “enter into a formal agreement” on how to deal with communism.9
During a visit with President Truman, the newly appointed Greek ambassador Vassili
Dendramis told President Truman that his intentions were to “pay tribute to the generous
thought” that had initiated from the Truman Doctrine for the Greek people.10 Ambassador
Dendramis would continue further to affirm that the Greek government in Athens would
“cooperate most cordially” with Washington’s mission with a “high conception of solidarity.”11
This expression of gratitude was seen by Washington as a means to continue its efforts in Greece
despite the Greek government’s inability to bring order without subjecting the Greek populace to
what would amount to a communist witch hunt.
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This effort would signify the legitimacy awarded by Washington to Athens in an effort to
quell the communist influence, while it also granted the government in Athens the mobility to
deal with this issue without provocation. This would ultimately spell disaster for the remaining
Greek communists in the region. Later it would be apparent that the mission in Greece would be
best summed up as a “kill Communists crusade” with the increased military presence in Greece
to demonstrate that Washington “meant business in Greece.”12 This chapter will draw upon
many primary sources including numerous Greek and American documents that outline the
importance of Greece geopolitically to the global need for democracy. The documents detail the
Greek prime minister’s calling upon the assistance of the United States government and the
emergence of covert operations during peacetime in an effort to impede the communist influence
(many FRUS documents will includes the implementation of psychological warfare and torture
tactics).
These documents will help contextualize the argument that these government
proclamations and initiatives became a common authoritative stance against suspected
communists in Greece despite the implications of numerous human rights abuses. These
systematic adaptations to Greek policies through Washington’s influence prove that they acted
from this point forward in a complicit nature regarding the direction of the oppressive
παρακρατος in Greece. The importance of Greece as an ally in a dawning Cold War took
precedent in the region, thus allowing Athens to become a παρακρατος despite being a
democratic nation on paper. This study into the political mechanisms of control will help bring to
light what role Greece played in the early onset of the Cold War. Despite being overlooked by
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many Cold War historians, the Greek crisis would initiate Washington’s foreign policy to evolve
into finding a more modern method in dealing with this new kind of war.
Through the emotion of fear, Greek politics stressed loyalty to the country first and
foremost without any allusion to ideologies outside the accepted norm of democracy and
anticommunism. Greece became embattled against communism through the reissuing of past
legislation; such as the use of loyalty statements called δηλωεις, the use of civic-mindedness
certificates, and the function of re-education camps to rehabilitate the Greek people from
adhering to adverse leftist ideology. The following chapter will discuss the role of these
mechanisms of political control instilled by the various ruling parties of Greece. The role of
loyalty became a vital part for the citizens of Greece in regards to their existence as productive
members of Greek society. With the passing of Greek Law 1612 (December 31, 1950),
suspected communists, spies and other members of the KKE were tried by martial courts (many
resulting in the death penalty for treason). Although this law “reactivated the Metaxas
Espionage Law 375 (1936)”, this was clearly influenced with the admission of Washington’s
influence into Greek politics which also covered the “Greek security apparatus.”13 The KYP was
responsible for the coordination “of the anticommunist, anti-subversion program, and became the
official agency fighting the ‘internal enemy” within the Greek socio-political arena.14
Through these policies and directives, this chapter will discuss the role of loyalty to the
state versus political fear through measures such as the daily importance of the civic-mindedness
certificates and the act of the δηλωεις to the Greek populace. The use of Minas Samatas’
13
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research will help bring together the role of the emotion of fear into the daily lives of many
Greeks during the era of anticommunism. The use of these published forms will document the
clinical method used by the ruling Greek government to sanitize these policies by making the
subject vilified through accusations of disloyalty to the state. This threatened not only the
subject accused, but members of their family and closest acquaintances with the threat of
political fear, deportation or even death. The accused persons were now stripped of their
individuality by the state either to place them back within the accepted, loyal Greek community
or to place them in a category as an enemy of the state punishable by treason, which could result
in their death.
Various United States newspaper reports also detailed the common occurrences of human
rights abuses in these camps by illustrating the numerous calls for help by the Greek people to
the United States. But the neglect of Washington to act upon these reports also leads back to the
argument that the complicit nature of Washington’s diplomacy helped create and give legitimacy
to whatever Greek government was in power. This legitimacy by Washington gave credence to
the role of oppression in Greece to those suspected of being a communist. It seemed in order to
fight the fear of communism in the region; the use of state run fear under the παρακρατος would
address this issue of keeping communism out of Greece. In addition, this legitimacy gave
Greece the authority to use any means necessary to address the communist issue in their country.
As a mission of success, the method used in Greece would serve as future foreign policy
objectives elsewhere during the remainder of the Cold War.
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4.1 The Institution of a New Kind of War against an Ideological Adversary
Washington’s vested interests in the Mediterranean region lay between the Mediterranean
and Aegean seas as the gateway to the Middle East. Greece would be the initial test subject in
what Washington would later outline through numerous directives as the beginning of covert
operations during peacetime. Many other documents outline Washington’s urgent need for
action within the Greek political scene. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, who was the first director of
the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A) (May 1, 1947 to October 7, 1950) which was created
from the National Security Act of 1947, was responsible for the focus on creating a need for
secret operations. It was during the inception of the C.I.A. that the initial discussion began
involving this department and balancing intelligence gathering with covert operations. It was
also under his watch that National Security Council directive 10/2 went into effect granting the
C.I.A. the power of conducting covert operations:
The Central Intelligence Agency is charged by the National Security Council with
conducting espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad. It therefore seems
desirable, for operational reasons, not to create a new agency for covert operations, but
in time of peace to place the responsibility for them within the structure of the Central
Intelligence Agency and correlate them with espionage and counter-espionage operations
under the over-all control of the Director of Central Intelligence.15
Director Hillenkoetter had previously voiced his opinion that the C.I.A. should be the
only agency with the authority in conducting covert operations. Hillenkoetter wrote to the
National Security Council (May 24, 1948) that “the overt foreign activities” of the United States
“must be supplemented by covert operations” to maintain democracy throughout the globe.16
Under the imminent threat of Moscow, Hillenkoetter warned about the “vicious covert activities
of the USSR, its satellite communities and Communist groups” which sought to “discredit and
15
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defeat the aims and activities” of the United States and her allies.17 In a general memorandum
for the C.I.A., recent intelligence has given information concerning the KKE and its present role
within the Greek political sphere while being in exile. Through “U.S. information and cultural
programs”, these programs should “seek to convince the Greek people” that the “best means of
maintaining political and economic independence” is through maintaining a strong, Western
alliance.18
In a memorandum to Hillenkoetter from Deputy Director E.K. Wright, Wright upheld the
notion that “all matters dealing with propaganda and psychological warfare” should be operated
out of a branch of the State department and not the Security Council “due to their intimate
nature” with the executive office.19 Wright went further, in a separate memorandum to the Chief
of the Interagency Coordinating and Planning Staff, stating that an “isolated body of authority”
was needed to “watch” over the “black operations.”20 Wright defined this isolated body of
authority as “the sole agency to conduct organized foreign clandestine operations. To sabotage
this principle can only lead to chaos in this type of operation.”21
From the Office of Special Operations-Assistant Director Donald H. Galloway, an
important memorandum outlines Directive No. 18/5 (March 29, 1948). Directive No. 18/5
delineated the purpose of, whom he referred to as the Special Procedures Group, the group
assigned to perform these covert operations:
Special Procedures Group to engage in covert psychological operations outside the
United States and its possessions, for the purpose of (1) undermining the strength of
foreign instrumentalities, whether government, organizations, or individuals, which are
17
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engaged in activities inimical to the United States, and (2) to support United States’
foreign policy by influencing public opinion abroad in a direction favorable to the
attainment of United States’ objectives.22
The fostering of dependency seems to be created out of the Greek government’s need for
Western assistance against the fear of a communist invasion. This dependency gave way for
Western legitimacy as the Greek government would assist the anticommunist interests of their
Western ally. In fact Washington knew that Greece was using extreme measures in policing the
threat of communism within its borders, as the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for
Intelligence acknowledged that “Greece is heading in the wrong direction politically” in battling
the communist threat.23 But his main concern lay in the fact that “the current relaxed
international atmosphere in Greece” has benefited the left wing parties, and “provided the
stimulus for an upsurge in Communist politically activity.”24
To show a concern for the safety of Greece from the throes of communism, since the
banning of the KKE, “a gradual acceleration of propaganda” for the restoration of the KKE has
spread despite the Greek governments campaign of “forgetfulness and normalcy” to the Greek
people.25 This confused many in Washington as the fight against communism was viewed as the
justifiably moral fight by many American policy-makers. In addition with the resurgence of the
KKE’s political ideals in Greece, this helped direct the political motives of both Washington and
Athens to take this battle for ideological supremacy as top priority.
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A study prepared by the State department estimated the “clandestine membership” of the
KKE to be “30,000 in Greece with another 20,000-25,000 KKE members abroad.”26 This report
concluded that the “KKE appears to be pursuing a short-range program to neutralize” the
relationship between Greece and her Western ally, the United States.27 This interruption
between Athens and Washington would open a pathway for the Soviet influence and the feared
communist takeover of Greece. This report mentions that an economic debilitation through
military directives and procedures has placed a “considerable strain on the Greek budget, in
order to work toward the achievement of its force goals.”28 The passive acknowledgement of the
Greek economy being in danger through the government’s wasteful spending through the
military by Washington drives home that this Greek crisis meant more to Washington than the
actual economic rehabilitation of Greece.
After the inception of the C.I.A. and its Special Procedures Group mission to conduct
covert operations during peace time, Washington’s domestic policies heavily influenced how
Athens would approach this topic of ideological differences within its own borders. Granted the
precept notion had been in place during the Metaxas Regime (1936-1941) long before the Nazi
occupation, Washington’s influence granted legitimacy to this wave of Greek McCarthyism in
the eyes of the world as the only fitting way to combat communism.29 Samatas considers the

26

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 Volume XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Doc
291.
27
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 Volume XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Doc
291.
28
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957 Volume XXIV, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Doc
291.
29
Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive
Anticommunism and the United States Truman-McCarthy Era”, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Volume XIII,
Issue 3 (Fall-Winter 1986): 19-20.
Samatas discusses the similarities with the Emergency Law 516 which “gave Greek loyalty boards the authority to
decide on all present or prospective government employees’ loyalty based upon any written or oral information…
received from any ‘pertinent available information source” and Greek Law 1612 which was in “conformance with
U.S. law” and which “reactivated the Metaxas Espionage Law 375 (1936)”. These two laws coincided with

88
Greek version of McCarthyism to be “far more repressive and violent” than the version which
existed in the United States.30 What I wish to develop upon is Samatas’ argument that the Greek
version of McCarthyism was indeed more socio-politically devastating to the people of Greece
by using these methods of fear, terror and oppression.
The creation of the Greek loyalty boards under Greek Emergency Law 512 & 516 (1948)
paved a way for the legislative importance on the concept of Greek loyalty versus those
suspected or feared as communists. Those considered to be communists were brought before the
board in order to defend themselves under the accusations of crimes against Greece. Those
Greeks who accepted this legislative fear tactic were forced to produce a statement of repentance
against the ills of being a communist. This form, called a δηλωεις, was forced upon many
Greeks during the era of oppression as a means for control and fear of defying Greece in her time
of need. In fear for their lives or the lives of family members, many Greeks were forced to
produce a δηλωεις, such as Klaras was forced to during the Metaxas regime, to prove their
loyalty to the Greek government. These forms generally followed a pattern that stayed in a
standardized format during this oppressive era. This section will address four examples of these
δηλωεις to illustrate the importance of these forms when discussing the oppressive and violent
nature of Greek McCarthyism and the dangers it possessed to those Greeks on the wrong side of
the political spectrum. Once again, many thanks to Professor Minas Samatas for his generosity
in allowing me to use his previously published forms in my research. Without his help, this
thesis would not have been possible.

Washington’s attempt to quell any communist influence within the United States; therefore, Athens could utilize this
legitimacy to instill her own methods no matter what the cost.
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In Minas Samatas’ journal article entitled, Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative
Assessment of Greek Post-War Repressive Anticommunism and the United States TrumanMcCarthy Era taken from the Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, four examples of these loyalty
statements are examined (see figure 1.3-1.4). Due to the difficult nature of locating these
statements via online sources or archives without the benefit of traveling, Samatas granted me
permission to use his examples to show the sterile nature of how the Greek government dealt
with those considered being communist. The format of repenting one’s inequities towards
Greece became standard practice according to Samatas with these forms. These δηλωεις were
printed in daily government run newspapers and even read aloud during church services on
Sunday in order for all Greeks to be aware of the imminent threat of communism. Although the
following δηλωεις were produced during the era of the Colonel’s Junta (1967-1974), Samatas
contends that “they are similar to those printed during the period 1947-1963” in all regards.31
As discussed in Chapter One, Hobbes noted that fear was a by-product of the state for
order by creating “a sense of common purpose” for “modern elites” to exert fear “in order to
rule.”32 By creating this sense of unity through these anticommunist government directives
aimed at the social order of the country, the Greek government was responsible through these
δηλωεις in creating a wave of fear among those suspected. Samatas later writes that:
surveillance reflects both modernization and democratization of a state and society; aside
technological advance and determinism, surveillance function, impact, and control reflect
the power relations in a given society33
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Robin also argued that the two methods in which the state could manufacture fear through
political mechanisms were naming its common enemy and utilizing the threat of political fear
and terror. Under this methodology the use of the δηλωεις as political oppression was vital in the
fight against communism. The fear of personal death, due harm or death to family members,
socio-political ostracism, the threat of deportation for reeducation, and/or exile from Greece
clouded the minds of many fearful Greeks. The following will now examine these δηλωεις in
relation to how they were used as a fear tactic and a method of governmental control to oppress
those considered to be communists.
The παρακρατος utilized these statements as a government apparatus for control with the
arrested Greek communists to instill what Hobbes described as state run order through
campaigns of fear. These campaigns of fear were directed at maintaining a level of order
through submission and oppression under what Samatas refers to as Greek McCarthyism. By
analyzing Samatas’ published repentance statements, the translation of these forms places them
into the context of marginalizing the communist from being a member of the party and sterilizing
them into being a productive member of Greek society. This is evident according to the
normative guidelines promoted by both Washington and Athens as dictated in the legislative
initiatives aimed at the goal of ridding Greece of all communist influence.
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Figure1.4- ΥΠΕΥΘΝΟΣ ΔΗΛΩΣΙΣ #4 Publishedoriginallyin Mesogeois,July-Sept.1967andreproducedwithpermissionbyMinasSamatas
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As seen in figure 1.3, the first δηλωεις given as an example of a communist who accepts
the Greek government’s request to repent his allegiance to the KKE and publish his ill-fated
relationship within this statement.
δηλω υπειθυνως και εν γιωσει των συνεπειων του νομου περι ψευδους δηλωσεως στι
κατα την διαρκειαν της Κατοχης προσεχωρησα οικειοθελως εις το ΕΑΜ του χωριου
μου... αντιληφθεις την πλανην μου ΚΚΕ, δι ο και αποκηρυσοω τουτο σηφυαδας ως
αντεθνικας, προδοτικας και δρωσας εις βαρος της εδαφικης ακεραιο της πατριδος μας 34
Here ο υπογεγραμμενος (which translates into ‘the undersigned’) realigns his allegiance back
with Greece as he repudiates his association with the KKE, which he joined in August of 1944.
He states that from the day he signed this form, he “δηλω υπειθυνως” to the fullest extent of
Greek law, therefore, separating himself from the communist party and confirming his civicmindedness to Greece.35 He continues with:
αντιληφθεις την πλανην μου ΚΚΕ, δι ο και αποκηρυσοω τουτο σηφυαδας αυτου ως
αντεθνικας, προδοτικας και δρωσας εις βαρος της εδαφικης ακεραιο τητος της πατριδος
μας36
His direct assumption of guilt and realignment of his loyalty to Greece is a result of his fear of
being considered anti-national, treacherous, and part of the ongoing concern within the borders
of Greece. This particular δηλωεις is a great example of how the threat of being anti-national or
34
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treacherous to Greece under the current regime instilled fear and terror into those suspected of
being communists and how to renounce one’s party affiliation outright and all commandments
obeyed during this time as a party member. The second δηλωεις in figure one, ο
υπογεγραμμενος declares:
δηλω υπευθυνως οτι παρασυρθεις εψηφισα επι τι διαστημα ευθυς μετα την ΕΔΑ.
Σημερον ομως διαπιστωνω οτι το κομμα τουτο ειναι αντεθνικον και προδατικον και οτι
επιβουλευεται την ακεραιοτητα και την εθνικην υποστασιν της πατριδος μου,
αποκηρυσησω τουτο και τασσομαι ανεπιφυλακτως παρα το πλευρον της Εθνικης
Κυβερνησεως37
The accused states that he was led astray by the communist party after the liberation from
the Nazis. He continues with the statement affirming the Greek government’s claim that the
communist party is anti-national with an end result of treachery and evil that impinges the
integrity of the Greek character and my homeland.38 He ends the statement by unconditionally
repudiating his allegiance with the communist party and asserting to adhere to the qualities of the
Greek national government.39 As seen in the first δηλωεις, the language stays along the same
lines as both υπογεγραμμενος appear to repent their allegiance to the communist party
wholeheartedly to re-align themselves under the blanket of the Greek government’s new
approach to anti-communism. They both announce that the communist party is anti-national
with only treacherous goals in store for Greece’s socio-political future.
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We see that these two δηλωεις are prime examples of how state run fear tactics could
easily persuade the suspected Greek communists to renounce their political affiliations when
prompted by the Greek government under national minded qualities. As we move onto figure
1.4, ο υπογεγραμμενος declares:
Παρασυρθεις κατα την εφηβικην μου ηλικιαν υπο των κηρυγματων του ξενοκινητου
κομμουνισμου δηλω σημερον υπευβυνως στι αποκηρυσοω αυτον ως ιδεολογιαν μη
αρμοζουσαν εις ελευθερους ανθρωπους και δη Ελληνας, θεωρω αυτο και τα πασης
φυσεως υποκαταστατα και τασσομαι ανεπιφυλακτως παρα το πλευρον της Εθνικης
Κυβερνησεως40
Here the accused explains that during the time of the occupation, he was led astray by a deputy
of the KKE who spoke of unpatriotic sermons of communism.41 As seen in the previous
δηλωεις, the formula remains the same in repudiating the communist ideology as not appropriate
for Greece, while declaring all members of the communist party as unpatriotic and a traitor and
aligning himself as unconditionally patriotic to Greece.42 As Samatas declared, a pattern does
exist within these government mandated forms to declare one’s allegiance and patriotism to
Greece.
These δηλωεις begins with the formal declaration of one’s wrong doings according to the
Greek anti-communist directives followed by the supposition of un-patriotism and anti-national
motives coming from the communist party ideology. This form of political fear drives the ο
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υπογεγραμμενος to a state of morbid fear for the safety of not only themselves, but also their
loved ones and family members. No one was safe when it came to the massive surveillance that
the Greek government had amassed on its populace. With the combination of the ΙΔΙΟΝΥΜΟ
νομους (Idionymo laws) and numerous φακελοι, the Greek government had begun to take control
of the Greek population with fear and with no end in sight.43
While the ΙΔΙΟΝΥΜΟ νομους helped produce the fear of arrest, harmful interrogations,
deportation, or even death in the heart of many Greeks, the branding of a Greek citizen as not
loyal to the country in the φακελοι could mean a worse sentence. The act of branding one as not
loyal, or μιασμα (translated as non-nationally minded dirt), in Greece could mean the loss of
many social freedoms and even ostracizing from the socio-political sphere. To be accused of a
ΙΔΙΟΝΥΜΟ νομους meant one’s social and political doom most certainly under the statute of a
“thought crime, guilt by association, or collective responsibility.”44 Samatas writes that this
ideological battle between anticommunists and communists, as Washington first joined, was
called the “deEAMization” of the Greek population through these various mechanisms of
political control.45
By using the principle factor as loyalty to Greece, the government was able to transform
the population into a divided mass through ideological lines and fear. Many forms of
surveillance, such as the use of χαφιεδες (or informers), helped bring the modernization of
surveillance in Greece to such a success in battling the threat of communism. The Greek
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government used the imminent threat of poverty in a time of high unemployment and a fledgling
postwar Greek economy as temptation to lure “mostly ex-communists and lumpen (sic)
proletarians who purchased their freedom by spying against fellow” Greeks.46
The Greek government used the temptation of attaining public employment as a “socioeconomic mechanism for upward mobility… (and) political control” in exchange for monetary
support by the Greek government.47 The Greek government understood that the push for a
unified loyal population was dependent upon making sure every citizen feared the alternative.
With these methods of surveillance and various political mechanisms of control, the Greek
government proved successful in keeping the communists and those associated with the adverse
ideology at bay in a turbulent, socio-political time in postwar Greece.
4.2 A Domestic War in Greece against Communism
In an article titled “Murder Inc, in Greece” by Olive Sutton, he illustrates just what his
title claims in post-Truman Doctrine Greece. Sutton explains the “raids on villages” by
Lieutenant General James Van Fleet and the horrendous “pictures of the victims in the
newspapers” supported by the American-backed Greek government.48 Sutton explains that
“650,000 people have been uprooted from their homes” as a direct result of these raids carried
out by Greek government forces.49 Where this number comes from is the key question to take
from this line in his narrative. There is no source quotation in the article; therefore, the statement
lacks validity but shows that this culture of fear created perhaps myth-making to help this fear
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permeate throughout the Greek society. Either way, it is imperative to consider the role of
United States troops in Greece and their duty in helping the Greek government to consider these
methods of state control through fear tactics. Although lacking concrete evidence to support
these claims, Sutton’s article should be viewed in the context of the existence of suffering and
state run fear which existed in Greece regardless. This article was created with the intent of
informing the public of how Washington backed the παρακρατος in its effort to create fear in the
minds of the Greek populace.
Under article IV entitled “The State Department Starts Shoving”, Sutton tells of a
massacre which occurred during March 31, where “1,289 persons were assassinated” as a direct
result, and a member of the “American supervisory mission” named Helen Crosby “resigned
because of things she saw” in Greece.50 Sutton argues Crosby witnessed “police terror and fixed
electoral lists” that allowed names of deceased Greeks to participate in the 1946 elections.51
Sutton gives no apparent citations for the included quote from Mrs. Crosby, but it is necessary to
include when discussing the culture which arose from this culture of fear in Greek society:
I resigned because the total ultimate effect of our intervention in Greek affairs would
clearly be to establish an unrepresentative, undemocratic government and thereby to
encourage a new and more terrible civil war.52
Sutton implies that Washington saw Greece as their neo-colonial subject with the “policy
to extend American control… by force, if necessary” and granting legitimacy for the Greek
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government with two measures.53 First, with the formal declaration by Paul Economou-Goras
for help in “black and white… from the Greek government” and lastly with the “agreement” by
putting the Marshall-Truman Doctrine “into operation” making Greece an “American colony”
with Washington serving as the “colonial administration.”54 Sutton concludes that the mass
arrests and deportations “went into effect… on a grand scale” after the indoctrination of the
Truman Doctrine and its policies.55 Sutton cites that during July 1947, the Athens government
“arrested 15,000 more men and women”; many would be deported to reeducation camps such as
Icaria.56 On Icaria, Demetrius Paparigas, Secretary-General of the Greek Confederation of
Labor, wrote that “9,000 prisoners (arrived) from the mainland” and “were in danger of dying
from starvation and disease… under indescribably inhuman conditions.”57 These conditions
were meant to break the spirits of the detained communist Greek traitors and reeducate them into
becoming productive members of an anticommunist Greek society.
Sutton contends that this act of war has been bestowed upon Greece by Washington
despite Truman’s declaring that the operation in Greece is purely a “military program” bent on
preventing communism from taking control in Greece.58 The argument of validity may play a
role in the creation of this article, but what the reader should not discredit is the reasoning behind
its creation. Simply put, the emotion of fear was being instilled into the culture of Greece to
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combat this emergence of European communism in an effort to roll back any communist
influence within the Greek government.
This chapter brought together the methods utilized by the Greek government as a means
to oppress those considered to be μιασμα to Greece and how these tactics could inflict harm to
the accused. These policies were at times very harsh and detrimental to the sanctity of the Greek
psyche, as these policies would cause the Greek populace to repent crimes against Greece even if
they were innocent in nature. Failure to do so would mean death, socio-political marginalization,
and even deportation to make-shift Greek island prisons used to break down the μιασμα of
Greece. Just the threat of being forced to leave one’s family would cause the repentance
statement to be filled out, even if it was in error. Due process was not a part of the Greek
judicial system during this era of anti-communist legislation, unlike its American counter-part.
This caused much pain and hardship to the Greek populace, resulting in the παρακρατος gaining
political influence with many forms of oppression against communists.
Despite the conditions in post—Civil War Greece, this oppressive behavior lasted
throughout much of the Cold War until the end of the Junta (1974). The nature of the past has
caused much harm to the fragility of emotions for the surviving Greeks of this era of oppression.
Those Greeks who did not leave the country during this time were forced to succumb to the
παρακρατος and their policies against communism in post war Greece. I hope that this thesis can
awaken the need for an in-depth look into how these policies and initiatives caused a nation to
live in fear, despite being a democratic nation regulated in peace and justice for all. The need for
additional scholarship on this subject will open up the history of early United States foreign
policy during the Cold War and how it became a neo-colonial attempt at impeding the Soviet
menace from becoming victorious in this ideological war. Furthermore, there is the need for
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scholarship illustrating how Greece used the guise of Soviet containment to feed its craving for
retribution against the left via their role in the Greek Civil War. Greece played out a much larger
role within the Cold War narrative than what most history books outline presently. This thesis
should awaken the historian to new paths of academia in Cold War research regarding Greece
and the super powers.
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Conclusion
In summation, the Cold War era in Greece was very hostile to the communist ideology
and its followers. With any form of governmental oppression instituted in Greece, my research
argues that there are many similarities between Greece, a NATO ally, and any Communist Soviet
Bloc country in relation to the treatment of their populace. From just the understanding of how
these measures were initiated in pre-emptive fashion by preventing a communist takeover of
Greece, one would assume this would have been the by-product of a government built on
complete control and oppressive mechanisms much like any Soviet Bloc country during the Cold
War era. This narrative brought to the forefront what role Greece actually played in the larger
context of the Cold War between the two global Super Powers. And how this marginalization of
the Greek populace (whether communist or not) was justified through means of political rhetoric
aimed at the destruction of the dissident left. This era produced a strict, marginalization of
anyone considered to be a Greek national dissident during the post-Civil War era which caused a
culture of fear to permeate throughout Greece in fear of being branded a traitor.
It is understood by many Cold War historians that a communist takeover in Greece would
have given a clear path for the Soviets to march into the Middle East, therefore, halting the oil
reserves that the United States and its allies depended upon for their survival. This cry for help
by Greece was shadowed under a cloak of retribution by those who were targeted during the Red
Terror campaign during the Greek Civil War. Washington had their apprehensions concerning
the methodology used by the Greek government, but ultimately the fear of a communist takeover
won over the minds of the bureaucrats in Washington. This dire point of view in Washington
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helped benefit the corrupt opportunists holding various key positions within the Greek
government. During such a fragile time in Greek history, Washington aided not only in
rehabilitating Greece’s economy but also advancing a campaign of White Terror bent on
retribution for past misdeeds by the communists during the Greek Civil War. These acts of
aggression during the Civil War only added more fuel to a subdued hostility that resulted in the
culture of fear in a post—Civil War Greece.
What Washington did was grant the Greek government the legitimacy to use these
oppressive techniques discussed in this narrative to marginalize the Greek communists and even
those suspected of suspicious, dissident activities. By allowing governmental mechanisms of
control, Washington placed the need for a secure, Democratic gateway to the Middle East and
the containment of communism over the rights of the Greek populace. These governmental
mechanisms of control which led to the culture of fear included the use of the δηλωεις, the
application of the civic-mindedness certificates, and the use of the ΙΔΙΟΝΥΜΟ νομους and the
creation of the re-education camps. This course of action led Greece to mimic the oppressive
nature of many Soviet Bloc countries despite being the birthplace of democracy. Washington
should not have allowed these oppressive mechanisms of control in a country that was a current
member of NATO if this behavior was not allowed within the borders of the United States.
Fighting fire with fire led to much internal chaos with the constant threat of a societal
uprising which led Greece into a political and an impending, financial crisis. The present shape
of Greece echoes many horrors of the past. Due to the negligent nature of Greece’s political
leaders, this helped usher in the financial woes which Greece faces today in the European Union.
The civil unrest has laid dormant from the end of the Junta (1974), only to rise up and take the
populace into a violent, frenzy in the wake of the push for harsh, economic austerity measures.

104
The need for further research into this tumultuous era in Greek history and its context within the
Cold War should be addressed by Cold War, European, and Transnational historians. A more,
in-depth look into the lives of these marginalized Greeks is where the focus needs to be initiated.
These historians need to ask the pertinent questions relating how their daily lives were
affected by these oppressive mechanisms and what the after effect created within this Greek
culture of fear. Researching available primary documents relating to the oppressed Greeks hold
the key to how life was viewed in a post—Civil War Greece. By focusing on the oppressed, this
will open a new light into how this era related to the overall context of Cold War history. A new
kind of war fought neither on U.S. nor Soviet soil, but instead on a European Mediterranean
country known for its classical antiquity and myths of legend. This new kind of war beckons
that the Cold War will be known infamously as an implacable conflict of embattled ideologies
being fought on foreign soil. In causation, the blood of the innocent would be spilled and the
cries of their mothers would be shed in abundant amounts without concern by either side of the
Super Powers.
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